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As Antarctica’s Scientific Age was about to begin, IGY program leaders in Washington were still working frantically. They well knew that Deep Freeze II represented the last chance for everything and everybody going to the Antarctic. The fiscal 1957 supplemental budget , which would fund about half of the U.S. IGY, was still awash in the legislative process, and more than half of the scientific bases were not yet so much as sited with certainty—a burning concern but one out of their control. Many scientists were still to be chosen, and they all had to be equipped, trained, and transported during the austral summer of 1956–1957 to have their programs up and running by 1 July 1957. There were still internal and international policy issues As I stood out on the stern of the ship at midnight a couple nights ago, and the sun was shining over the icebergs and pack ice and on the side of the beautiful, high, rugged Victoria Range, I couldn’t imagine myself being any place but here. That may sound strange to you, Sweetie, but I just couldn’t imagine my being out of this big show. —Carl Eklund, 19561 O N T H E E V E People, Preparations, Policies C H A P T E R E I G H T 217 218 O N T H E E V E to settle, relationships to define and cultivate among the participating countries , and, even now,Antarctica’s future to consider amid fears of the Cold War. Topping many anxieties for theAmerican IGY organizers throughout 1956 was the still-incomplete roster of scientific station leaders. These all-important individuals would have to shepherd their respective programs to fulfillment and inspire harmony among their human charges, both vital roles. But in IGY minds, they also had to be “well-seasoned people who can command the respect of the Navy contingent at each site, establishing a position of dominance [emphasis added] by their maturity and experience,” Odishaw had written to Gould in April, as the command-structure negotiations warily continued. Further , unless key decisions were made soon, “we may not be able to assume our proper leadership in the Antarctic.”2 Antarctic science leaders Wexler and Crary met with Gould in his polarexpedition –decorated Carleton College office in mid-June 1956 to consider leader choices. As Crary recollected, one was Finn Ronne, who was, with some pull from Senator Francis Case of South Dakota, still pursuing government funding for his own expedition but had now persuaded the Navy to name him military leader of the Weddell Sea IGY station. He had then approached Odishaw and Crary about the scientific leadership; he was, wrote Crary, “reluctant to take one position without having the other.” Gould attested to his exploring ability and geographical contributions along the Antarctic Peninsula and, without further ado, called Ronne with an offer. Wexler wrote of his “excellent record at stimulating scientific work” and concluded, “I think we’re lucky to get Finn.” Ronne would get both titles at the station of his choice.3 Carl Eklund, a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ornithologist who had wintered at East Base with the U.S. Antarctic Service, was an easy selection for Wilkes Station. His condition—to work on his own biological problem—they readily agreed to, despite the IGY’s geophysics focus. But after that it was not so easy. Wexler’s diary reveals chase after chase of eminent polar personages, only to have them decline or be deflected for one reason or another. Alton Wade, with two Byrd Antarctic expeditions to his credit, and E. E. (“Eddie”) Goodale, decorated both for his dog driving with Byrd in 1928 and later for Arctic weather expertise, were listed for Byrd and Little America stations, respectively , but both eventually declined. Worried about finding an academic meteorologist of “sufficient caliber” to head the joint effort at Cape Adare, Wexler eventually persuaded Dr. James Shear of the University of Kentucky to sign on. Gould, Odishaw, the Defense Department, and Byrd had all been leaning on Paul Siple for the scientific leadership of South Pole Station; indeed , for many others, like Crary, he was the “obvious choice.” But Siple de- [13.59.136.170] Project MUSE (2024-04-25 09:15 GMT) 219 O N T H E E V E murred over objections to dual command as well as for professional and family reasons. Calling himself “virtually drafted,” he finally agreed in August...

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