Civil War Leadership and Mexican War Experience

Henry Halleck and the Military Executive

100 Henry Halleck and the Military Executive Like Sherman’s, Henry Halleck’s Mexican War experience would be in California . There Halleck held such political-military and administrative positions as secretary of state, chief of staff, and lieutenant governor in the Mexican city of Mazatlan (Hattaway and Jones 54). His service in California was exemplary, demonstrating “great energy, high administrative qualities, excellent judgment and admirable adaptability to his varied and onerous duties.” Bennett Riley, the military governor, was moved to declare, “Whatever success my administration has attained is mainly owing to the efficient aid rendered by Captain Henry W. Halleck, the secretary of state. To him should be the applause. He has never failed me” (Eldredge). In such a capacity, Halleck saw almost no combat, but Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones conclude that in the Civil War,“Halleck’s executive experience in California proved quite useful” (63). COMMAND OF THE MISSOURI DEPARTMENT On November 19, 1861, Halleck replaced John C. Frémont as commander of the Missouri Department. Frémont had made a mess of things. Hattaway and Jones consider Frémont “a disastrous failure as a military executive,” whose “temperament was ill adapted for management” and who had produced “a complex and ineffective administration in Missouri” (55). Halleck considered it “complete chaos.” He found troops unpaid and without proper uniforms and weapons and the Confederates “in possession of nearly one-half of the State” (Hattaway and Jones 64). HENRY HALLECK AND THE MILITARY EXECUTIVE 101 In terms of finance, supply, and organization, the department was in a shambles. Under Halleck, however, “fraudulent contracts were annulled; useless stipendaries were dismissed; a colossal staff hierarchy, with more titles than brains was disbanded; . . . the construction of fantastic fortifications was suspended; and in a few weeks order reigned in Missouri” (Hattaway and Jones 55). Halleck reported that the “machinery for the supply of the Army is rapidly getting into working order” and that he was “in hourly communication with headquarters of divisions” thanks to the telegraph. Even Confederate President Jefferson Davis noted the difference, observing that “the Federal forces are not hereafter, as heretofore, to be commanded by Pathfinders [Frémont’s nickname] and holiday soldiers but by men of military education and experience in war” (Hattaway and Jones 64). For Halleck, that “experience in war” had been in an administrative capacity in California, but it was exactly what the current situation in Missouri required. Now Halleck could turn his attention to implement General in Chief George McClellan’s order to consolidate the Federal hold on Missouri and concentrate “the mass of the troops on or near the Mississippi” in preparation for future operations (Hattaway and Jones 55). In this regard, Halleck had also benefited from the Mexican War by gaining an appreciation for strategic lines of operation. Winfield Scott, Halleck wrote, had been “truly strategic” in his movement to Vera Cruz, and Halleck greatly admired Scott’s turning movement at Cerro Gordo, which cut off Santa Anna’s line of retreat. On the contrary , Halleck disapproved of Zachary Taylor’s line of operation, noting that “Santa Anna, from his central position fought, with the same troops, the battles of Buena Vista and Cerro Gordo” (Hattaway and Jones 16). Halleck made use of this understanding of lines of operation one night in late December or early January when he was strategizing with George Cullum , his chief of staff, and William Sherman, his fellow veteran of California. Sherman recalled that General Halleck had a map on his table with a large pencil in his hand, and asked, “Where is the rebel line?” Cullum drew the pencil through Bowling Green, forts Donelson and Henry, and Columbus , Kentucky. “That is their line,” said Halleck. “Now where is 102 THE FEDERALS the proper place to break it?” And either Cullum or I said, “Naturally the centre.” Halleck drew a line perpendicular to the other near its middle, and it coincided with the general course of the Tennessee River; and he said, “That’s the true line of operations” (Sherman 1:248) Halleck had correctly ascertained the Confederate weakness on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers and developed a plan to “turn Columbus and force the abandonment of Bowling Green” (Hattaway and Jones 65). “This line of the Cumberland or Tennessee is the great central line of the Western theatre of war,” Halleck wrote McClellan (Nevins 6:17). The result of this...