The Presidency, Congress, and Divided Government: A Postwar Assessment

Tables

Tables xiii 1.1. Yearly Presidential Success Rates in the House: The Impact of Divided Government by Era /  1.2. Institutional and Electoral Factors: Yearly Presidential Success Rates in the House of Representatives, ‒ /  1.3. Divided Government and the Senate: Yearly Presidential Success Rates, ‒ /  1.4. Veto Threats and Vetoes Cast on Major Legislation, Selected Periods of Divided Government /  1.5. Autoregression of Significant Laws on the President’s Agenda and Subject to Veto Politics /  1.6. Significant Legislation and Presidential-Congressional Agendas and Interaction, Divided Government, ‒ /  1.7. Significant Legislation and Presidential-Congressional Agendas and Interaction, Unified Government, ‒ /  2.1. Truman’s Legislative Success Rate, th Congress /  2.2. Logistic Regression Estimation of Party Support for Truman, th Congress /  2.3. Eisenhower’s Legislative Success Rate, Close and Nonclose Votes, d‒th Congresses /  2.4. Logistic Regression Estimation of Republicans’ Domestic Policy Support for Eisenhower, d and th Congresses /  2.5. Logistic Regression Estimation of Democrats’ Domestic Policy Support for Eisenhower, d and th Congresses /  3.1. Nixon’s Legislative Success Rate, st and d Congresses /  3.2. Logistic Regression Estimation of Democrats’ Domestic Policy Support for Nixon, st and d Congresses /  3.3. Logistic Regression Estimation of Republicans’ Domestic Policy Support for Nixon, st and d Congresses /  4.1. Reagan’s Legislative Success Rate, Close and Nonclose Votes, th‒th Congresses /  4.2. Logistic Regression Estimation of Democrats’ Domestic Policy Support for Reagan, th and th Congresses /  4.3. Logistic Regression Estimation of Republicans’ Domestic Policy Support for Reagan, th and th Congresses /  5.1. Bush’s Legislative Success Rate, st and d Congresses /  5.2. Logistic Regression Estimation of Democrats’ Domestic Policy Support for Bush, st and d Congresses /  5.3. Logistic Regression Estimation of Republicans’ Domestic Policy Support for Bush, st and d Congresses /  5.4. Clinton’s Legislative Success Rate, th Congress /  5.5. Logistic Regression Estimation of Democrats’ Domestic Policy Support for Clinton, th Congress /  5.6. Logistic Regression Estimation of Republicans’ Domestic Policy Support for Clinton, th Congress /  6.1. Kennedy’s Legislative Success Rate, th Congress /  6.2. Logistic Regression Estimation of Democrats’ Domestic Policy Support for Kennedy, th Congress /  6.3. Logistic Regression Estimation of Republicans’ Domestic Policy Support for Kennedy, th Congress /  6.4. Johnson’s Legislative Success Rate, th and th Congresses /  6.5. Logistic Regression Estimation of Democrats’ Domestic Policy Support for Johnson, th and th Congresses /  6.6. Logistic Regression Estimation of Republicans’ Domestic Policy Support for Johnson, th and th Congresses /  7.1. Carter’s Legislative Success Rate, th and th Congresses /  7.2. Logistic Regression Estimation of Democrats’ Domestic Policy Support for Carter, th and th Congresses /  7.3. Logistic Regression Estimation of Republicans’ Domestic Policy Support for Carter, th and th Congresses /  7.4. Clinton’s Legislative Success Rate, d Congress /  7.5. Logistic Regression Estimation of Democrats’ Domestic Policy Support for Clinton, d Congress /  7.6. Logistic Regression Estimation of Republicans’ Domestic Policy Support for Clinton, d Congress /  Tables ...