In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Fig. I.1. Presidential Leverage: Party Control, Congressional Organization, and Electoral Factors /  Fig. I.2 Seat Gains for the President’s Party in the House of Representatives, – /  Fig. I.3. “Marginal Coattails”: Presidents’ Share of the Two-Party Vote Compared to House Members’, – /  Fig. I.4. Percent of Split Districts, House of Representatives, – /  Fig. I.5. Percent Party-Unity Votes, – /  Fig. I.6. Aggregate Party Support for the Presidents’ Positions, – /  Fig. I.7. Divided Government: Presidential Floor Success and Positions in Support of Legislation, House of Representatives /  Fig. I.8. Unified Government: Presidential Floor Success and Positions in Support of Legislation, House of Representatives /  Fig. I.9. Presidential Agenda Setting in Proportion to the Total Legislative Agenda of Congress, th–th Congresses (–) /  Fig. I.10. “Positive” Presidential Leverage in Political Time: The Eras of Congress /  Fig. 1.1. Annual Presidential Floor Success Rates by Party Control, House of Representatives /  Fig. 1.2. Ideological Distance Scores Between the President and Majority Party in the House of Representatives, By Party Control and Congressional Period /  Illustrations xi ...

Share