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Chapter 2: “A Troop of Boy Scouts Flying Kites Could Take These Damned Islands”
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Chapter2 61 C H A P T E R 2 “ATroopofBoyScoutsFlyingKites CouldTakeTheseDamnedIslands” O nacoldmid-February,1941,dayinWashington,Maj.HoytVandenberg ’saide,1stLt.WilliamBurt,descendedthestairwaytothesecond flooroftheMunitionsBuildingandheadedovertoRoom2103, whichwassharedbytwohigh-rankingAirCorpsofficersassigned tostaffdutiesintheWarDepartment’sWarPlansDivision.Burtwas followinguponaFebruary11memorandumfromMaj.Gen.GeorgeH. BrettintheOfficeoftheChiefoftheAirCorpstoBrig.Gen.Leonard T.Gerow,theinfluentialheadoftheWPD.Vandenbergthoughtitwould notbeadvisableforhimtobeseendiscussinghisBattleofBritain–style planforthedefenseofthePhilippineswiththeWarDepartmentGeneral StaffandwasthereforeusingBurtasaliaisonwiththeWPDforanysuch discussions.1 Brett’smemorandumformallyrecommendedthattheWarDepartment authorizethecreationofanairforcecommandinthePhilippines composedofa“strikingforceechelonandanairdefenseechelon”and thatplansandestimatesbepreparedforthecommand,shouldtheWar DepartmentdecidetoreinforcethePhilippineDepartment.Brettwanted atleastonelong-rangebombardmentwingasthestrikingforceanda pursuitwingfortheairdefensecomponent,eachtoconsistofthreeor moregroups,plusadditionalgroundandaircomponentstocreateabalanced force.2 Brett’s proposal—minus the bombardment force—clearly originated intheplanVandenbergandBurthaddesignedduringtheprecedingtwo monthsandwerestillhopingwouldgainWarDepartmentapproval.As Burtdescribedtheirplaninsomedetail,bothCol.JosephT.McNarney andLt.Col.CharlesC.Chaunceyseemedtoagreeonitslogic.Theyhad ch2 4/2/03,1:03PM 61 PartI 62 beenassignedtotheWPDinordertoreflectAirCorpsinputattheWar Departmentstafflevel,butbothhadbeentoobusytostudythelessons oftheBattleofBritainforideasapplicabletotheaerialdefenseofthe United States and its overseas territories. AlthoughVandenberg’s and Burt’splanhadthesupportoftheirfellowAirCorpsofficers,theyall knewtheWarDepartmentwouldhavetotaketheinitiativeinintroducing it,andthatGerowwouldhavetobewonoverfirst.Atpresent,the WarDepartmentwasstillopposedtoabuildupofdefensivestrengthin thePhilippines.3 Despite theWar Department’s unwillingness to support the establishment ofaneffectiveairdefenseforceinthePhilippines,itdidnot opposeaproposalfromGeneralGrunertthathisstaff“studythepossibility offormationofanairdefensecommand”fortheislands.Inresponse toGrunert’sradiogramrequesting“availabledata”toassistinpreparing suchastudy,GerowhadauthorizedsendingGrunertthereportandrecommendations ofBrig.Gen.JamesE.Chaney—commanderoftheAir DefenseCommandatMitchelField,NewYork—onChaney’sOctober– November,1940,visittoEnglandasan“observer.”4 AsmembersoftheGeneralStaff,McNarneyandChaunceywerealso privytoinformationthattheWarDepartmentwaseasingupslightlyonits policyagainstreinforcementofthePhilippines.TowardtheendofFebruary ,GerowwouldhaveinformedthemthatGeneralMarshallhadauthorized the shipment of“modern” P-40B pursuit planes and a squadron ofB-18twin-enginebomberstotheislands,andthatthepresidenthad approvedthechiefofstaff’ssuggestionthatairfieldstherebeexpandedto accommodatealargerforce.5 Onbothqualitativeandquantitativegrounds,Vandenbergwasquite unimpressedwiththedecisiontosendasquadronofP-40BstothePhilippines .Threeweeksearlier,hehadwrittenanoteforSpaatz’ssignature advising Gerow that the P-40B’s two .50-caliber and four .30-caliber machinegunsprovidedinadequatefirepower.Hearguedthatsix.50-caliber gunswereneededtoassuresuccessagainstmodernall-metalaircraft. Vandenberg considered the P-40B unsuitable“for operations against a first-classairpower.”Moreover,evenifitwere,hewouldhavefeltthat assigningasinglesquadronofsuchshipswasapitifulresponsetothereal needsofanairdefenseforceforthePhilippineswhencomparedtothe twelvesquadronshewantedallocatedtomeet...