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Part 1: “By God, It Is Destiny That Brings Me Here!”
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PartI 33 p a r t 1 “By God, It Is Destiny That Brings Me Here!” Washington,Tokyo,Manila,andSingapore: September,1940–June,1941 partI 4/2/03,1:03PM 33 PartI 34 partI 4/2/03,1:03PM 34 [54.224.52.210] Project MUSE (2024-03-19 13:53 GMT) PartI 35 REACTING TO THE JAPANESE INCURSIONintonorthern FrenchIndochina,SecretaryofStateCordellHullcalledapressconference onSeptember23,1940.Inunderstateddiplomaticlanguage,Hull indicatedtheStateDepartment’s“disapproval”oftheupsettingofthestatus quoinIndochina,whichheallegedhadbeenaccomplished“underduress.” Three days later, President Roosevelt retaliated by ordering a complete embargo—effective October 16—on the export of scrap iron and steel excepttoGreatBritainandLatinAmerica,astepviewedasthestrongest sanctiontodateagainstJapan,whichwasalmosttotallydependentonthe UnitedStatesforsuchmaterialforitswarmachine.1 Although seniorWar Department officers were equally concerned aboutthethreatposedbythenewlysignedTripartitePactlinkingJapan withGermanyandItalyandtheJapaneseoccupationofnorthernIndochina ,theydidnotviewsuchdevelopmentsasnecessitatingarevisionof long-standingWarDepartmentpolicytowarddefenseofthePhilippines. OnOctober10,theWarPlansDivisionchiefaddressedamemotoChief ofStaffGeorgeC.MarshallrecommendingthattheUnitedStatesadopt thesecondofthreealternativesregardingdefenseofthePhilippines:withdrawing Americanforcesfromtheislandsassoonaspossibleandestablishing anewdefenselinealongthe180thmeridian,justwestofMidway Island.Thethreeoptionsinthepolicypaperwerethesameasthoseput forwardonAugust21,1939,thatMarshallhadfailedtoactupon.2 SecretaryofWarHenryL.StimsonmetwithMarshallinmid-October todiscussthequestionofthedefenseofthePhilippines.Theseventythree -year-oldStimson,whoin1927–29servedasgovernorgeneralofthe Philippines,hadonlyrecentlybeenappointedtohisnewpost,andthus wasanewcomertoWarDepartmentpolicytowardtheislands.However, partI 4/2/03,1:03PM 35 PartI 36 hisviewsonthesubjectweresimilartothoseofhisnavalcounterpart, NavySecretaryFrankKnox,withwhomhehaddiscussedtheFarEastsituation onOctober2.StimsonandKnoxagreedthat“softmethodswould benogoodatthistime”fordealingwithJapan.AbandoningthePhilippines rancountertotheirviewsontheFarEastsituation.Knoxandhis NavyDepartmentwereparticularlyconcernedabouttheweakdefenses forthenavalbaseatManila,wheretheAsiaticFleetwouldbestationed beginninginmid-OctoberaftershiftingfromShanghai.3 AsearlyasFebruary,1940,thenavyhadargued—inoppositiontothe WarDepartmentposition—that“evenaminorincrease”inarmyaviation strengthinthePhilippineswouldsufficetodeterJapanfromattackingthe islands.UnderpressurefromboththenavyandMaj.Gen.GeorgeGrunert inthePhilippinestoprovidesomeofthemodernfighterplanesMarshall had promised the Philippine Department commander in early October, MarshallandStimsondevelopedaplantotakeoverashipmentofsixty Seversky EP-1 pursuits that had been contracted for Sweden and send forty-eightofthemtothePhilippinesinstead.OnOctober18,Stimson securedthepresident’sapprovaloftheplan,despitethefactthatthedecision rancountertonationalpolicynottoreinforcethePhilippinegarrison.4 Butwhowouldflytheaircraft,whichhadbeenredesignatedRepublic P-35As,amodificationoftheshipscurrentlyassignedtotheArmyAir Corps?InOctober,1940,therewereonlyninepursuitpilotsstationed inthePhilippines.TheArmyAirCorpschief,Maj.Gen.“Hap”Arnold, initiallyresistedMarshall’scallfortwoofhisfewstateside-basedpursuit squadronstobetransferredtothePhilippines,butonOctober16reluctantly directed his own Plans Division to prepare a plan for assigning pilotsfromtwopursuitsquadronsintheGeneralHeadquartersAirForce (GHQAF)tothePhilippineDepartment.ArnoldinturnaskedMarshall toauthorizeacompensatoryincreaseinGHQAFstrength.Twodayslater, the1stPursuitGroup’s17thPursuitSquadron,basedatSelfridgeField, Michigan,andthe35thPursuitGroup’s20thPursuitSquadron,basedat HamiltonField,California,wereorderedtodepart...