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Prologue: “Seize This Golden Opportunity!”
- Texas A&M University Press
- Chapter
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“SeizeThisGoldenOpportunity” 15 P R O L O G U E “SeizeThisGoldenOpportunity!” W henGen.GeorgeC.MarshallreportedtohisofficeintheMunitions Building inWashington, D.C., on September 1, 1939, after beingsworninasthenewchiefofstaffoftheU.S.Army,amemo preparedelevendaysearlierbytheWarPlansDivision(WPD)was waitingonhisdesk.ItcalledforMarshalltomakeanimmediate decision on future military policy toward the Philippines, a commonwealth of the United States since 1935.Three options were identified: WastheWarDepartmenttorecommendthattheUnitedStatesmaintain thestatusquo,withdrawitsforcesfromthePhilippinestoanewdefense lineinthePacificalongthe180thmeridian(areaofMidwayIsland),or reinforcetheislandsinordertomaintainadominantU.S.positioninthe westernPacific?1 ButMarshall’smindwasfocusedonthesituationinEuroperather thaninthePacific.ThestartlingnewsthatdaywasthatGermanyhadsuddenly launchedamassiveinvasionofPoland.Forthepresent,thequestion ofdefenseofthePhilippineswouldhavetotakeabackseattothemore pressingconcernsMarshallfacedathomeinthewakeofHitler’slightning attack. TheWPD—theWarDepartment’sinfluential“thinktank”—wanteda decisiononthePhilippinesquestionthatwouldresolveitslong-running disagreementwiththeNavyDepartmentontheissue.UnderWarPlan Orange,whichconstitutedtheagreeduponarmy-navypositiononPhilippines defenseintheeventofaJapaneseattack,thePhilippinegarrison’s missionwastoholdManilaBayasabasefortheU.S.PacificFleetanda reliefforce.2 ThenavyhadtraditionallysoughtastrongnavalbaseinthePhilippines and the army defenses necessary to protect it, but the army regarded theislandsasamilitaryliabilityratherthananassetandforthatreason opposed reinforcing them—particularly after the 1934 U.S. decision to prologue 4/2/03,1:02PM 15 December8,1941 16 grant the Philippines independence in 1946.The army’s policy was to maintainitsexistingstrength,especiallyforprovidingprotectionforthe harbordefensesinManilaBay,but“togotonofurtherexpenseforpermanent improvementsunlesstherebyultimatesavingswillresult.”3 Beginninginthemid-1930s,defenseofthePhilippinesmeantprimarily airdefense,giventherapidgrowthofairpowerasadestructiveforce in warfare during the period.The army had maintained a composite groupofwarplanesforPhilippinesdefensesince1920,butbythe1930s itsaircraftwereprimarilydiscardsfromHawaiianandcontinentalU.S.air basesthatwerebecomingincreasinglyobsoleteattheendofthedecade. AWarDepartmentAirBoardcreatedinMarch,1939,torecommendfundamental policiesgoverningthetacticalandstrategicuseoftheArmyAir Corpshadconcludedinitsreportsixmonthslaterthat“nofurtherconsideration ”shouldbegiventostrengtheningthePhilippines’airdefenses giventheexistingnationalpolicyofnomodernizationorexpansionof armyforcesthere.ItacceptedthattheJapanesecouldseizethePhilippines beforetheUnitedStatescouldreinforcethegarrison.Consequently,it deemedthePhilippinesgarrison“asacrificeforce”anddeclinedtostudy airdefenserequirementsfortheislands.4 While theAir Board report conformed to theWar Department’s positionondefenseofthePhilippines,thePlansDivisionoftheOffice oftheChiefoftheAirCorps(OCAC)washeadinginanoppositedirection .OnSeptember1,1939—justbeforethereleaseoftheAirBoard’s report—Lt.Col.CarlA.Spaatz,thedivisionchief,signedamemorandum fortheattentionofMaj.Gen.HenryH.Arnold,theAirCorps chief,thatdevelopedanambitiousairpowerstrategyforthePhilippines diametricallyopposedtoWarDepartmentpolicyandthepositionofthe AirBoard,threeofwhosefivearmymemberswereWarDepartmentstaff officers.5 The author of this heretical report was a forty-year-oldWest Point graduatebroughttothePlansDivisioninthesummerof1939bySpaatz followingcompletionofhisone-yearassignmenttotheArmyWarCollege (AWC)in1938–39.SpaatzhadgivenCapt.HoytS.Vandenberganassignment thatsummertoprepareoneoffivesecretstudiesfordeterminingAir CorpsrequirementsinconnectionwithimplementationoftheAirBoard’s report.In...