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Preface
- Texas A&M University Press
- Chapter
- Additional Information
Preface T wenty-fiveyearsagoIbeganresearchontheexperiencesofarmypursuit pilotsoftheFarEastAirForceintheill-fatedPhilippinescampaign of1941–42.Afterthirteenyearsofeffort,theresultswerepublishedas DoomedattheStartin1992.DuringmyresearchIalsobecamefamiliar withtheexperiencesofthebombercrewswhosharedClarkField withthepursuitpilotsonDecember8,1941,aswellasthoseofthemen operatingtheradarunitatIbatothewest,providingearlywarningofthe approachingJapaneseattackforceonthatfatefulday. In1951,WalterD.EdmondsrelatedthestoryofwhathappenedatClark FieldonDecember8inhisnow-classicbookontheArmyAirForcesin theairwarinthePhilippinesandDutchEastIndiesin1941–42.However, hisaccountoftheDecember8attackwas,inmanyways,notcomplete. HeexcludedtheexperiencesoftheAirWarningCompanyoperatingthe radarunitatIba,forexample,aswellasthoseoftheantiaircraftregiment andtwotankbattalionsthatattemptedtoengagetheJapanesebombers and fighters over Clark Field.The experiences of the Japanese airmen whocarriedouttheattackwerealsoleftoutoftheaccount.Furthermore, Edmondsmadenoattempttopresenttheairdefenseplanningforthe PhilippinesortodiscussthedecisionsmadebytheWarDepartmentand ArmyAirForcesheadquartersin1939–41.Thelatterhelpsusunderstand whytheDecember8disasteroccurred.Equallyexcludedweretheplans andstrategiesoftheJapanesehighcommandinTokyoandonFormosafor theattackonthePhilippines. InpointingoutthesegapsinEdmonds’spresentation,Idonotmean tocriticizehim.HisguidancefromtheArmyAirForcescalledforhim towriteanaccountofthepersonalexperiencesofthemeninvolvedin preface 4/2/03,1:02PM 7 thefirstsixgrimmonthsoftheairwarintheSouthwestPacific.Hewas notaskedtoconsiderhigher-levelWarDepartmentandArmyAirForces headquartersplanninganddecisionmakingortoincludetheJapaneseside ofthestory.Edmonds,afterall,wasawell-knownnovelist,notamilitary historian.Hishighlyreadableaccountwasmyintroductiontothesubject andtriggeredmydesiretoknowmore. Anotherpersonwasresponsiblefordevelopingmyinterestinwhatwas happeningatArmyAirForcesheadquartersthatsetthestagefortheevents inthePhilippinesonDecember8,1941.Intheearly1980s,retiredcolonel WilliamR.BurtwasresearchingprewarArmyAirForcesandWarDepartment recordsattheNationalArchivestoprovidedocumentationforthe bookhewasplanningonhisexperiencesin1940–41asanaidetoMaj. HoytS. VandenbergintheAirCorps’sPlansDivision.ColonelBurt’sfocus wasontracingVandenberg’seffortsinearly1941tointroduceanaerial defensesystemforthePhilippinesbasedonlessonslearnedfromtheBattle ofBritain.WhenhelearnedofmyresearchontheeventsoftheDecember 8attack,heinvitedmetojoinhimashedugthroughtherecordsof theArmyAirForces’headquartersandtheWarDepartment’sWarPlans Divisioninanefforttotrackthedevelopmentsthatultimatelyledtothe July,1941,decisiontobuilduparmyairpowerinthePhilippines,butwith anemphasisonoffensive,ratherthandefensive,capabilities.ColonelBurt wantedtotracethePhilippines’aerialreinforcementquestionalltheway uptothepresident’slevelinseekingtoidentifywhy Vandenberg’sproposal todevelopaBattleofBritain–typedefensewasrejected. Yet,ifIrelatedthestoryonlyfromtheAmericanside—however comprehensively—IwouldbeleavingouttheJapaneseandtheanswers to several important questions. How was the decision to attack the Philippinesastheopeningphaseoftheirso-calledsouthernoperations made?Whatstrategydidtheyformulatetothatend?Whatrolesdidthe Japanesearmyandnavyairforcesplayinthestrategythatwasdeveloped ?WhatweretheexperiencesofindividualJapaneseintheairattack thatopenedhostilities? Inseekingtoanswerthesequestions,IwasobligedtoexamineJapanese -languagesources,giventhepaucityofinformationonthissubjectin English.Fortunately,Ihadalreadycorrespondedwithmostofthesurviving Zeropilotsregardingtheirpersonalexperiencesin...