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Epilogue
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Epilogue 409 Epilogue I ncarryingouttheirstrategyofdestroyingAmericanairstrengthin the Philippines before attempting to land invasion forces, the Japanese achievedgreatersuccessonthefirstdayoftheirefforttogainair superiorityintheskiesoverLuzonthantheyhadimaginedpossible. Inmaterielterms,theydestroyedtwelveoftheFarEastAirForce’s nineteenClark-basedB-17s(ofatotalPhilippinesforceofthirty-five)and thirty-fourofitsninety-twoP-40Es,theonlymodernbombersandpursuit shipsintheAmericanarsenal.Twoofthefivepursuitsquadronswere eliminatedasfightingunitsinasinglestroke,andofthethreeremaining ,onewasequippedwithanobsoleteaircraftproventobeincapableof stayingintheskywiththeZero-sen.Theoneoperationalradarsetwas destroyed,leavingUSAFFEblindtosubsequentJapaneseairraids. Thedestructionwasalsoheavyinhumanterms.Nineofthe24thPursuit Group’spilotswerekilledinaction,plus26enlistedmenandaground officer,whilethe19thBombGrouplost10flightcrewmenand21ground personnel.The7thMaterielSquadronattachedtothe19thGrouplost4 enlistedmenanditscommandingofficer.Fiveofthe30menintheIbaAir WarningServicedetachmentwerekilledintheattackonIba.Although thetotallossoflifeinallunitsbasedatClarkhasneverbeendefinitively tallied,MacArthuronDecember9reportedlosing“about55killedand 110wounded”atClarkFieldandatIba“3officersand19enlistedmen killedand16officersand22enlistedmenwounded.”1 AnothercasualtyoftheJapaneseattackwasthespiritoftheyoung menintheFEAF,somanyofwhomthatmorninghadbeencarefreeand confidentthattheJapaneseposednoseriousthreattoAmericanairpower, despite warnings to the contrary by their pursuit commander. By that afternoon,theirmoralehadsunktothebottom,theirbeliefinAmerican superioritycrushed. epp 4/2/03,1:07PM 409 December8,1941 410 Was the Japanese attack on Clark and Iba Fields on December 8, 1941,“anotherPearlHarbor”?MacArthur’sPhilippinesintelligencechief thoughtnot.Ina1954biographyofhiscommander,Col.(laterMaj.Gen.) CharlesA.Willoughbycriticized“theattempt...madetoequatetheloss of17bombersatClarkFieldwiththelossofthebattleshipsatPearlHarbor .Buttherereallyisnocomparison.Brereton’spitifulnumberofplanes wasneverenoughtoaffecttheissueinthePhilippinesandtheywould soonhavedisappearedthroughattritionevenwiththemostcarefulhusbanding .”Historians,however,donotsupporttheopinionofWilloughby, whowasnotexactlyadisinterestedevaluatoroftheattackorofMacArthur ’sresponsibilityforit.AsRearAdm.EdwinLayton,JohnCostello,and RogerPineauhavemaintained,“Comparedtothisstrategicdisaster[Clark Field],thelossofthefivebattleshipsatPearlHarborhadrelativelylittle influenceonthecourseofthewar.”Costello,incontrast,assertsthatthe entire“Anglo-AmericanstrategyintheFarEasthingedonMacArthur’s airpower.”Withitsnear-destructioninoneblow,notonlywasthedefense ofthePhilippinesdoomed,thatofMalayaandtheDutchEastIndieswas alsogreatlyweakened,hemaintains.Indeed,inmyview,LouisMorton’s conclusion that“the Japanese had removed in one stroke the greatest singleobstacletotheiradvancesouthward”isasvalidtodayaswhenhe recordeditfiftyyearsago.2 ThisisnottocontestWilloughby’sassertionthatBrereton’sairforce would,inanyevent,havebeendestroyed“throughattrition.”Thatwould have been the fate of any force—American, British, or Dutch—that opposedtheJapaneseintheearlymonthsofthePacificWar.Whileneither itnoranyotherforceinplaceatthetimecouldhavereversedtheinevitable outcome,theFEAFcouldhavesignificantlyincreasedthecostofseizing thePhilippinesandtheJapanese’othersouthernobjectivesandupset theirtimetableofconquestifit(anditsradarcapability)hadnotbeen crippledonthefirstdayofthewar.Overthenextfivemonths,thePhilippines campaignwasfoughtasadelayingaction.MacArthur’sannounced intentiontostrikeFormosaonthemorningofDecember9never,for reasonsthatremainunclear,materialized.Inanyevent,thesurvivingB-17s neverattackedFormosa.3 Yet...