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Chapter 7: “We Are Going Much Too Far on the Offensive Side”
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Chapter7 197 C H A P T E R 7 “WeAreGoingMuchTooFar ontheOffensiveSide” T henewcommandinggeneraloftheairforceunitsassignedtoU.S. ArmyForcesintheFarEastwascheckingoutthesituationatthe NicholsFieldairdepotanddidnotlikewhathefound.“Completely inadequate,”hetoldhisstaffandtheofficerinchargeofthedepot astheywentthroughthedepot’shangaronedayduringthesecond weekofhisassignment(November10–15).Hefoundnosparepartsavailable forthefiftyP-40Esthatthedepothadassembledweeksbeforeor fortheP-40BsoperationalsinceJuly.Norwasthere“somuchasanextra washerornut”fortheClark-basedB-17s.Therealsowasnotasinglespare motorfortheP-40s,B-17s,oroutmodedP-35As.Evenmoredamning,the depothadfewtoolsofanykindwithwhichtoundertake“evenrudimentary repairandmaintenance”ofNichols-basedaircraft.Hewasinformed oftheplansforexpandingdepotoperationstocatertothehugebuildup ofaircraftunderhiscommand,buttheprojectmemorandumcoveringthe expansionhadjustbeenreferredbacktoUSAFFEbytheWarDepartment formodificationandarevisedestimateoffunding.Suchdelaysonlyexasperated Maj.Gen.LewisBrereton,whowasamanofaction,notwords.1 At Clark Field, Brereton was somewhat more encouraged. He was impressedwiththe“enthusiasmandefficiency”withwhichhispursuit andbomberpersonnel—includingtherecentlyarrived19thBombGroup (Heavy)aircrews—werecarryingouttheirtraining.Theywereallhandicapped bythelackofequipment,buttheyweretakingstepstoprepare theirunitsforalleventualities.However,Breretonnotedthatnoneofthe aircrafthadbeencamouflagepaintedandthatnoblastpenshadbeenbuilt to protect them. Nor had the field’s antiaircraft artillery defenses been emplaced.2 ch7 4/2/03,1:05PM 197 PartIII 198 BreretonalsopaidavisittoDelMonteFieldonthenorthernendof Mindanao.Hethoughtthefieldwasadequateforconductingbasicair operations,butitcompletelylackedsupportfacilities.Heknewthat,as elsewhere,aprojectmemorandumhadbeensubmittedtotheWarDepartment fordevelopingthefieldintoafull-fledgedoperationalfacility,but thetimingdependedonhowfasttheWarDepartmentapprovedtheproject andmadefundsavailabletocompleteit. Brereton’sgeneralimpressionfollowinghisinspectionswasthatwork hours,trainingschedules,andoperatingproceduresinhiscommandwere based“onthegoodolddaysofpeaceconditionsinthetropics.”Thegeneral ’saide,Capt.NormanJ.Lewellyn,wrotehiswife“Wefoundthatfew peopleworkhere.”ThosewhohadbeenservingunderClagettmusthave wonderedwhatBreretonwouldhavethoughthadheobservedconditions beforeMay,1941.Certainlytherehadhadbeenimprovementssincethen, althoughaslateasOctoberslackconditionswerestillineffectatClark, at least among engineering personnel. However, with the October 23 arrivalofthe7thMaterielSquadron,chargedwithengineeringsupport forthe19thBombGroup,threeshiftsbeganoperating,providingroundthe -clockmaintenancefortheB-17s.Priortothesquadron’sarrival,shop personnelhadbeencomingtoworkfifteenminutestohalfanhourlate eachmorning,“putteringaroundforacoupleofhours,”takingone-hour coffeebreaks,thenknockingoffforthedayat11:30,accordingtoa7th MaterielSquadronman.3 Inresponsetotheconditionshejudgedunsatisfactory,Breretonissued neworders.Workhoursdevotedtotraining“wereincreasedtothemaximum ”andatleast40percentofallflighttrainingwastobedevotedto nightoperations.Aircraftmaintenancewastobecarriedoutdayandnight untilcompleted.Noaircraftweretobetakenoutofcommissionduring flyinghoursforroutinechecksorforthescheduledtwenty-andfortyhour inspections.TheNicholsFieldairdepotwasputonatwo-shift,sixteen -hourworkday.4 TheseandotherordersissuedbyBreretondidnotalwayssitwellwith theofficersandmenaffectedbythem,includingLt.GeorgeArmstrong. OnTuesday,November11,Armstrongfoundhimselfspendingthedayand nightconfinedtohishousenearNicholsFieldasthe17thPursuit’s“Alert Officer”fortwenty-fourhours.Underthe“Preparationfor...