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Chapter 6: “Feasibility of Direct Attack on Luzon in the Philippines”
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Chapter6 153 C H A P T E R 6 “FeasibilityofDirectAttack onLuzoninthePhilippines” A t 9:45 on the morning ofWednesday, October 15, 1941, General BreretonwasbackinHapArnold’sofficeasafollow-uptohisinitial meetingwiththeAAFchiefonOctober6.Duringthepreceding weekhehadgonebacktoTampatomakearrangementsforwinding up his duties as theThirdAir Force commander.1 This time ArnoldhadcalledBrig.Gen.OliverP.Echols,Maj.JamesA.Doolittle,and Spaatztojoinhimfordiscussionswiththenewlydesignated—asofOctober 7—commanderoftheUSAFFEairforceinthePhilippines.2 Itwas intendedtobeonlyaverybriefmeeting,however,andafterfifteenminutes BreretonandSpaatzwalkeddownthehalltotheWarRoomforthe mainbriefingitemoftheday:apresentationofthenewA-WPD/1plan. Thistime“Bomber”Georgeandhisteamwerenottryingtoconvince anoutsiderofthemeritoftheirplan,butsimplyprovidinginformationon ittoBreretonandhisdesignatedchiefofstaff,Col.FrancisBrady,andhis intendedG3,Maj.CharlesCaldwell,whomhehadbroughttoWashington fromTampaforbriefingsontheirPhilippinesassignments.3 Afterthe briefing,GeorgeinformedBreretonthattheAirWarPlansDivisionstaff wastryingtogeteverythingtogethertheypossiblycouldbytheendof thedaythatwouldbeofhelptohiminhisnewassignment. That afternoon, Brereton met with Marshall for the first time, as arrangedearlierinthedaybythechiefoftheWarPlansDivision,Brigadier GeneralGerow.ThechiefofstaffspokefranklytoBrereton:building upairpowerinthePhilippineshadbeengiventoppriority.4 Marshallgave Breretondetailedinstructionsonhismissionandemphasizedtheislands’ increasedimportanceinWarDepartmentstrategy. AshehadwithArnold,Breretonrespondedfranklytothechiefof staff.IfthesituationwereindeedcriticalintheFarEast,thebasingofa ch6 4/2/03,1:04PM 153 PartII 154 vulnerableforceofB-17sinthePhilippinesrantheriskofaJapaneseair attacktoneutralizeitbeforeunitsarrivedtoprotectit.Brereton’sconcern wassharedbyanotherofMarshall’stop-rankingofficers.MajorGeneral JosephA.Green,chiefoftheCoastArtillerybranch,whothreeweeks after Marshall’s meeting with Brereton warned the chief of staff that “almostsurelytheenemy,inanefforttoneutralizethese[bombardment] forces,willundertakeatanycostairraidsagainst[their]bases.” Viewing theantiaircraftforcesinthePhilippinesas“totallyinadequate,”Green recommendedthatMarshallsendantiaircraftregiments“nowtrainedin theU.S.”tothePhilippinesassoonaspossibletoprotecttheB-17sfrom enemyairattack.ButMarshallrepliedinmuchthesamelanguageArnold hadusedninedaysearlier.Itwasacalculatedriskthathewaswillingto take.TheJapanesewereunlikelytotakeanyhostileactionbeforeApril1, 1942,andbythenallofthePhilippines’airreinforcementsshouldbein place,includingforairdefense.5 “WhencanyouleaveforthePhilippines?”Marshallasked. “Assoonasmyinstructionsarecompleteandtransportationcanbe provided,”Breretonreplied.6 Hehadonemoreday’sworthofbriefingstoattend,afterwhichhewas scheduledtoflytoSanFranciscotopickupthePanAmericanClipperto Manila.ColonelBradywouldberemainingintheWPDuntilSaturday, October18,tocollectafinalbatchofdocumentsthatHalGeorge’sstaff waspreparingforhimtotaketothePhilippines.7 The following day, Arnold and his senior staff officers met with BreretonintheWarRoomforafinalbriefing.TheAAFchiefwantedto elaboratefurtherontheFarEastsituationanddecideexactlywhatwas needed to ensure Brereton’s new command would operate efficiently. TheyagreedthatBreretonwouldreceiveanAirWarningServicebattalion (lessthecompanyalreadyinthePhilippines)fromFortLawton,Washington ,givinghimatotalof1,174AWSpersonnel.Abattalionofaviation engineerswouldalsobesenttospeeduptheconstructionofairfields.Signal andordnancecompanieswouldbedispatchedtoimprovethePhilippines airforce’scommunicationsandlogisticsposture.8 Arnoldsaidthat...