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Part 2: “If We Make Our Attack Now, the War is Not Hopeless”
- Texas A&M University Press
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PartII 91 p a r t i i “If We Make Our Attack Now, the War is Not Hopeless” Tokyo,Washington,andManila: June–October,1941 partII 4/2/03,1:03PM 91 PartII 92 partII 4/2/03,1:03PM 92 [34.229.223.223] Project MUSE (2024-03-19 05:33 GMT) PartII 93 GERMANY’S UNEXPECTED INVASIONoftheSovietUnion onJune22,1941,emboldenedtheJapaneseNavyMinistryandthenaval GeneralStaffintheirplanningforsouthernoperations.OnJune23,they decidedtosetupbasesandairfieldsinsouthernIndochinaevenifthat action“riskedwarwithBritainandtheUnitedStates.”Thenewlyappointed (fromApril10,1941)chiefofthenavalGeneralStaff,Adm.OsamiNagano, assertedthattheestablishmentofmilitarybasesinFrenchIndochinaand Thailandwasnecessary.Twodayslater,aliaisonconferenceapprovedthe decisionandtheemperorgavehisimperialsanction.1 OnJuly2,anImperialconferencecalledbyPremierKonoeendorsed theestablishmentoftheGreaterEastAsiaCo-prosperitySphereanda southward advance.The“Outline of the Empire’s National Policies in ViewoftheChangingSituation”forthefirsttimeusedtheexpression “warwithBritainandtheUnitedStates”inaformalpolicystatement, althoughtheconferenceconcludedthatmovingtroopsandaircraftinto southern Indochina would not provoke the United States into“coming outagainstJapan.”Atanyrate,theoperationwasconsideredworth therisk,intheviewoftheparticipants.EmperorHirohitoapprovedthe policydocument,buthopedtoavoidawarwitheithertheUnitedStates ortheSovietUnion.Thejustificationgivenforthesouthernadvancewas “self-defenseandself-preservation.”2 A move into southern Indochina and the subsequent establishment ofbasesforthenavy’sland-basedbomberstherewouldreducetheneed forcarriersinsupportofsouthernoperations.Allofthenavy’sland-based airpowerhadbeencentralizedsixmonthsearlierunderasinglestrategic commandwiththeestablishmentoftheEleventhAirFleetonJanuary15, partII 4/2/03,1:03PM 93 PartII 94 1941,andViceAdm.Takajirō ŌnishibeganpreparingitspilotsinAprilfor anattackonthePhilippines.3 FollowingnegotiationswithVichyFrance,morethanfortythousand Japanese troops began entering and occupying southern French Indochina without incident on July 25. Four days earlier,Admiral Nagano proclaimedataliaisonconferencethatifwarbeganimmediatelywiththe UnitedStatesbecauseofsuchamove,theJapanese“wouldhaveachance ofachievingvictory”becausetheywerefaraheadoftheAmericansin their war preparations, although he acknowledged that the advantage woulddeclineifsuchawardraggedout.Naganoalsoarguedforseizure ofthePhilippinestomakeiteasierforthenavytocarryonthewar.His statementsdispleasedHirohito;theemperorknewthatthenavy’spreparations werebynomeanssufficientlyadvancedtotakeontheUnitedStates atthattime.4 In immediate response to the Japanese move, President Roosevelt on July26issuedanexecutiveorderfreezingJapaneseassetsintheUnited States,thushaltingalltradewithJapan.Itwascorrectlyregardedasan “oilembargo”bythepress,andwasfollowedbysimilarembargoesbythe BritishandDutch.TotheNewYorkTimes,itwas“themostdrasticblow shortofwar.”PriortoRoosevelt’sdecision,thearmyandnavychiefshad recommendedagainstsuchanaction.GeneralMarshallandAdmiralStark bothwereconvincedanembargowouldforcetheJapaneseeithertodrop theirlong-termstrategicobjectivesortomeettheiroilneedsbyseizing theDutchEastIndies—amovethatwouldsurelyleadtowar.5 Marshallwasplanningalessdramaticandunpublicizedresponseto thepreparationsJapaneseweremakingfortheirsouthernmovement.On July16,heinformedtheAirCorpschief,GeneralArnold,thathehad decidedthePhilippinesweretobegiven“greatstrategicimportance,” andthuswasreversingtheWarDepartment’slong-standingpositionon defenseoftheislands.ThenavalandairbasesinthePhilippineswere nowseenasconstitutingathreattothe“immediateflankoftheJapanese southernmovement.”6 SignalingthebeginningofthechangeinthePhilippines’roleinWar Departmentstrategy,RooseveltonJuly26createdanewarmycommand in...