Designing the Bayous: The Control of Water in the Atchafalaya Basin, 1800-1995

Chapter 4. Apres Le Deluge: The Jadwin Plan

Chapter 4 Apres Le Deluge: The Jadwin Plan THE FLOODING THAT ENDED the MRC's dependence on levees occurred in 1927. One of the nation's worst peacetime disasters killed between 250 and 500 people, flooded over 16 million acres, and destroyed 41,000 buildings. The Red Cross at one time cared for over 600,000 people, half of whom lived in temporary camps.l Against this backdrop of dramatic flood relief operations, dispossessed basin residents, and an overwhelmingly sympathetic nation, the Corps of Engineers hurriedly revised plans that it had clung to for 50 years. There was no lack of advice to the Corps. Engineers throughout the country wrote articles proposing remedies. In many cases, an Atchafalaya Basin outlet was a major feature of the recommended solutions. New Remedies for Old Problems THE 1927 FLOOD DRAMATICALLY REVEALED the value of an Atchafalaya floodway for the protection of Baton Rouge, New Orleans, and other Louisiana communities on the Mississippi River. The artificial Point a la Hache outlet below New Orleans began receiving Mississippi River water during the first wave of floods in January 1927. Water continued to pour into this outlet until July. During the third and worst wave of floods in April, New Orleans officials implored Louisiana Governor O. H. Simpson to order the levee cut at Caernarvon (a few miles downstream from Poydras) to save the city. Supported by the Mississippi River Commission, Simpson gave the order on 26 April and blasting began three days later.2 Still, the waters came. Crevasses occurred throughout the Atchafalaya Basin. At the end of March, the water broke through the levees at Simmesport and Red River Landing. Another break occurred at Old River in early May. Water overtopped the Bayou des Glaises levee during the night of 13 104 Designing the Bayous High water in the Atchafalaya Basin, mid-May 1927. Animals cling precariously to high ground at Bordelonville soon after water overtopped the Bayou des Glaises levee. May, rushing through a 600-foot crevasse at 30 miles per hour, inundating farms, and forcing people out of their homes in the middle of the night. Other breaks occurred in the levee the next day, and thousands of people required evacuation. On 17 May, a break occurred near Melville on the right bank of the Atchafalaya, shocking local residents who considered the Melville levee one of the strongest along the entire river. This break greatly increased the floodwater's velocity, rapidly resulting in severe caving of the river's left bank, which led to another break at McCrea on 24 May. Farther downstream, a crevasse occurred on 22 May, and the waters poured through until the middle of June, inundating Morgan City. These crevasses devastated the fertile areas surrounding Bayou des Glaises, the Atchafalaya, the Teche, and even around the lower Vermilion. Crops were destroyed and large parts of Lafourche, Terrebonne, St. Mary, and Assumption parishes were under water. From 1 to 12 feet of water covered almost all of St. Martin Parish. Struggling against overwhelming odds, basin residents found little consolation in the fact that the floodwater around them meant less flooding on the Mississippi River south of Red River Landing, and that their suffering and sacrifices brought a measure of safety to Bourbon Street.3 George H. Maxwell could barely control his anger. For years, he had preached about the importance of floodways in the lower Mississippi basin. For him, the 1927 flood indisputably proved his point. He indicted the Mississippi River Commission for having committed "the greatest engineering blunder in the history of civilization."4 He went on, "The Army Engineer-Mississippi River Commission stands charged Apres Ie Deluge: The Jadwin Plan 1°5 A crevasse at Moreauville during high water in the Atchafalaya Basin, mid-May 1927. with a gigantic failure to fulfill its obligations to humanity and to the federal government that created it. It has not performed its duties. It has not 'kept the faith.' It surrendered to the Levee Hierarchy."s Citing other engineers who had questioned relying on levees, Maxwell attempted to document what he considered the decades-old arrogance of the Army engineers. He accused the "levee hierarchy" of dooming the Waterway Commission created in 1917-and with it any hopes for a realistic flood control plan- without, however, mentioning that President Wilson chose never to appoint anyone to the commission. The "crowning folly" of the levee hierarchy was closing the...