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T he advent of 1833 brought another major shakedown of the federal government. Throughout 1832—since Santa Anna’s Plan of Veracruz—support for the Bustamante regime had been weakening . Members of his cabinet offered to resign in language that, if accepted , would have meant that Bustamante also had to step down. He rejected these offers and tried to rally the support of the military establishment . Acting executive Bustamante must have experienced déjà vu during the year, as these were the same sorts of unacceptable cabinet shuffles that had brought him to power. A compromise was worked out in December whereby Manuel Gómez Pedraza, the president-elect whom Guerrero had overthrown, was allowed to take office until a new president could be elected. On January 3, 1833, Pedraza and General Santa Anna entered Mexico City riding in the same carriage. Everyone knew, of course, who would hold the reins of the new government . In March the state legislatures elected Santa Anna as president of Mexico and Valentín Gómez Farías as vice president. Santa Anna, pleading that he was “too ill to take office,” retired to his estate of Manga de Clavo so he might be at a safe distance to watch how the promised reforms worked out. On April 1 Farías, a steadfast liberal, became chief of state in the absence of the duly elected president. Lucas Alamán, José María Bocanegra, and other former cabinet members were soon being persecuted for their activities during the Bustamante centralist regime.1 A letter that Santa Anna wrote on January 18, before his transition to power was complete, shows that he was not fooled by recent events in Texas. He was satisfied that the Anglo colonists had a “strong inclination to declare their independence of the republic,” and was well aware that they had cloaked their attacks on Mexican authority as support for his Plan. This was almost a personal insult. Santa Anna thought it “absolutely necessary” that General Filisola march into Texas, as planned, with good Chapter 12 Land Affairs Foremost officers and “the largest force possible.” The pretensions of the foreign colonists he considered “insolent,” and they had to be shown that they could not conduct illegal meetings and draw up proscribed memorials. As far as Santa Anna was concerned, “all their grievances and complaints tend to that [separatist] object,” even if they “have been wronged on several occasions.” He wanted Filisola’s army “to see that justice is done to the colonists, and that they are treated with the proper considerations.” Santa Anna’s idea of “justice” and “proper considerations” for traitors to the Mexican nation can be imagined.2 This letter came to the attention of Vice-Governor Juan Martín de Veramendi in mid-February, and he forwarded it to Political Chief Músquiz with stern instructions to tell the colonists that their political “excesses” would lead them to “utter ruin.” Veramendi correctly foresaw that more such consultations would be held, saying that their object was to separate Texas from Coahuila if not to accomplish full secession from the Mexican republic. He warned Músquiz against allowing these things to occur, and predicted that a constitution for self-rule would be next on the colonists’ agenda. Thus we learn that Santa Anna believed, as early as January 1833, that a military response was necessary to force the AngloTexans into showing more proper respect for Mexican institutions. We also learn that Veramendi had a clear idea of what was going on among his son-in-law James Bowie’s circle of Anglo friends at the time. This rather amazing letter has received little notice from historians. Among other things, it has a bearing on Austin’s chilly reception in the capital later that summer and on the reason Col. Juan N. Almonte was sent on an inspection of Texas at the beginning of 1834.3 Back in Texas, 1833 also saw the arrival of Sam Houston, who splashed across the Red River from Indian Territory in December 1832. He came armed with a commission from the U.S. War Department to persuade the Comanches and other wild tribes of the plains into traveling to Fort Gibson for peace talks. Houston also had schemes of his own, which involved the semicivilized tribes that the Jackson administration was pushing west of the Mississippi. Upon reaching Nacogdoches, Houston—considering his Indian-diplomat cover story—was probably introduced to Colonel...

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