Imagining Postcommunism: Visual Narratives of Hungary's 1956 Revolution

Notes

INTRODUCTION 1. ÁVO is an acronym for Államvédelmi Osztály (State Security Department ). The organization was renamed Államvédelmi Hatoság (State Security Authority) in 1948. Officially, the acronym ÁVH was used thereafter, but in everyday speech the secret police remained the hated ÁVO. 2. The entire speech appears in the appendix of Pető 2001. 3. János M. Rainer (1999a, 445) refines the notion of collective national amnesia when he writes that the silence of the Kádár era hardly means that people had forgotten what happened. The silence may have signaled acquiescence , he argues, but it did not imply public approval of the regime nor acceptance of its explanations about the “crimes” committed by Imre Nagy and thousands of others. Besides, he points out, the silence was far from complete. The “counter-revolution” was taught in history classes, and it was the subject of television documentaries and journal articles on major anniversaries. Gábor Gyáni (2001) also disputes the myth of total amnesia, noting that 1956 leaked into public consciousness in countless ways. For instance, Russian soldiers stationed in Hungary were a visible reminder of the uprising they had suppressed. Another reminder was the absence of the hundreds of thousands of people who emigrated in 1956, leaving behind family members and friends who felt the loss. Even the experience of living under the relative comfort of “goulash communism”—the palatable dictatorship dished up by Kádár in exchange for an end to political dissention—was an indirect reminder of the uprising . 4. György Litván (2000) has catalogued the dominant myths and legends specifically associated with the 1956 revolution. CHAPTER 1 1. Schönherz was arrested and executed during World War II as a result of his involvement with the illegal Communist Party. A political exile, Bolgár served as an officer in the Soviet Army during World War II and participated in the liberation of Hungary. After the war he represented Hungary as a diplomat to Czechoslovakia and then to Great Britain. NOTES 2. Art historian Géza Boros (1993) assembled excerpts from a number of news articles, editorials, conference papers, legislative proceedings, and competition entries that chronicle the development of the idea of Statue Park Museum . His collection is an excellent entry into the debates. 3. In the case of disagreements, the city had veto power over the districts. Ákos Tömöry (1991, 74) provides a chart that lists the monuments by district and indicates the recommendation of both bodies to either remove the work or leave it in place. 4. In a 1992 public opinion poll, residents of Budapest were asked to indicate their preferences regarding the fate of ten types of monuments. Lenin statues were regarded most negatively, but the results were still surprisingly positive. Only 9 percent of respondents believed the Lenins should be destroyed , and only 12 percent believed they should be warehoused; 46 percent would put them in the Statue Park, and 33 percent would leave them in place. Other works that were viewed somewhat negatively were memorials to Soviet heroes and statues of Marx and Engels. Those monuments that were seen most positively represented noncommunist leftist political figures, antifascist resisters, and Captain Osztapenkó, a Soviet soldier killed by the Germans during World War II. The Osztapenkó statue was an important landmark on the road to Lake Balaton, and its removal caused the greatest public consternation . See “A Múltat Végképp Eltörölni?” 1992. 5. I am thinking in particular of Imre Varga’s memorial to Béla Kun. Andr ás Rényi (2000) argues convincingly that not only is the work important aesthetically but also Varga never intended it to be a monument to the ideals of Kun or the Hungarian Soviet Republic. It is a clever farce, a parody of a monument. After all, Rényi points out, it was erected in 1986, by which time the idea of a monument to communism was absurd to anyone. See also Boros 1999. CHAPTER 2 1. The Austro-Hungarian Empire had been a self-contained unit with a common currency and an extensive internal market. Its breakup thus threw the Hungarian economy into turmoil. The crisis was intensified with the peace treaty in that the territories Hungary lost had been a major source of raw materials. By 1920, agricultural production was about 50–60 percent of its prewar level, and industrial production was about 35–40 percent...