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97 5. Sweden and Slovenia Civic Values and the EU on the Periphery Zachary T. Irwin T he idea of a periphery in political science has involved political, spatial, and economic relations of subordination. It is a widely appropriated idea whose currency has rivaled the most commonplace notions of political discourse. To speak of a peripheral European area and to include Slovenia and Sweden as potential candidates may at once seem to be both an annoying repetition of an obvious geographic fact and further encumbrance of an overly used concept. However, I wish to make a case for a Europe that is peripheral in its distinctive approach to a European identity and one that retains a more nuanced view of European integration than that envisioned in the Maastricht treaty. Although studies of Slovenian and Swedish attitudes toward the EU are not new, a comparison may help us to better understand the character of national identity in each. Both countries take seriously Maastricht’s promise “to respect national identities .” Neither considers isolation a practical choice. A majority of Swedes opted to join the EU in a referendum. In November 2002 then Slovenian president Milan Kučan explained that membership in the EU and NATO represented “a firm system of values, of democratic values.” Nevertheless, Kučan expressed “some [unspecified] doubts with regard to the future of the Union itself,” doubts likely similar to those of the Swedish foreign minister, the late Anna Lindh, who, along with Hungary’s foreign minister, objected to a “European super state,” preferring instead a “community of countries, peoples, regions, and communities.”1 For Slovenia, the choices concerning Europe are still narrower than that Sweden made, yet neither state shares the same enthusiasm for an integrated Europe associated with the Benelux group or even with Portugal, a geographic peripheral. The peripheral character is expressed less in geography than in public policy, such as debates about civic values in compulsory national education. What it means to be Swedish or Slovenian implies a socialization of certain values that strengthen a national identity that is increasingly cautious vis-à-vis a pan-European future. Before the recent defeat of the European constitution in French and Dutch referenda, buoyant visions of a dynamic Europe The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Monica Johansson-Irwin for both translating from the Swedish and editing this chapter. Irwin 98 confronted the resilient obstacle of durable national identity rooted in notions of political culture and legitimacy. For Sweden and Slovenia, cultural and linguistic identity transcend economic criteria or gross variables of modernization. Despite their differences, both countries consist of relatively small and homogenous populations in a distinctive regional environment. However successful, Slovenia is a transitional economy and newly sovereign state, whereas Sweden is a highly developed older sovereignty whose population is about four times larger. Nevertheless, despite earlier comparisons between Slovenia and other states, recent opinion measured through the Eurobarometer survey suggests a certain similarity between Sweden and Slovenia.2 Each country’s population is among the two most satisfied peoples of Europe. Fully 85 percent of Slovenes are “satisfied” or “very satisfied” with their lives, the highest percentage among all former EU candidates and higher than the EU average of 83 percent. Among Swedes the share is still greater (96 percent), with 39 percent “very satisfied” compared with a mean of only 21 percent as “very satisfied” among all members. While 88 percent of Swedes are “fairly proud” or “very proud” of their nationality, 92 percent of Slovenes shared the sentiment, again the highest rankings. More revealing is the fact that Slovenes who describe their identity as exclusively Slovene (39 percent), rather than “European and Slovene” (49 percent), exceed the EU average, as do Swedes (54 percent as “Swedish only” and 38 percent as “European and Swedish”). The distinction is not a reflection of provincial attitudes, as Slovenes and Swedes rank among the most traveled of all EU members. These figures tell little in direct comparison. An exclusively Swedish identity ranks well behind the British (62 percent consider themselves “British only,” and 27 percent “British and European”). However, except for the British, Swedish opinion, like the Slovenian, lies at the margins of its respective groups of EU members and former candidates. It is too early to tell whether EU admission will change Slovenian attitudes, as they have not for Sweden. Both nations share a similar uncertainty about EU institutions. Some 30 percent of Slovenes “tend not to...

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