Reagan on War: A Reappraisal of the Weinberger Doctrine, 1980-1984

4. The Pentagon Doctrine: Using American Military Power Decisively in Lebanon

4 t TH E P E NTAGON DOCTR IN E Using American Military Power Decisively in Lebanon E ven as the Reagan administration wrestled with policy for Central America, it also faced decisions for a different region halfway around the world—the Middle East. In keeping with his promise to provide leadership on the international stage, in June 1982, President Reagan decided to get involved in the war being fought in the small nation of Lebanon. Israeli, Syrian, and Palestinian forces, as well as separate factional militias, were fighting on Lebanese soil. Reagan adopted two policy goals for Lebanon: withdrawal of all foreign forces and establishment of a stable central government. To ensure these ends, he also adopted a third policy objective: a secure border for Israel. To develop and execute a strategy for achieving those ambitious political objectives, senior administration officials needed to account for the relationship between national political objectives, the use of military power, and political realities both at home and abroad. Secretary of Defense Weinberger and Gen. John W. Vessey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, clashed with recently appointed Secretary of State George Shultz and Reagan’s special envoy to the Middle East, Philip Habib, over how US forces ought to be used in Lebanon. The Pentagon Doctrine 61 To understand the events leading up to the call for US military assistance and the subsequent reaction from Congress, the American public, and the Pentagon, one must analyze the historical context of US policy toward the Middle East in the 1970s and the policy the Reagan administration inherited. The commitment of forces in Lebanon illustrates conditions under which military power might be deployed decisively, conditions later encapsulated in the Weinberger Doctrine by the end of the administration’s first term. Background on the Middle East O n 1 6 Ja n ua r y 1 9 7 9 , the shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, abdicated his authority to the revolutionary forces gripping his nation and departed for the United States.1 Two weeks later, on 1 February , Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, exiled since October 1964, returned to Iran and by year’s end had used the shah’s absence (for medical treatment in the United States) and the seizure of American hostages as an opportunity to take power and impose a theocratic regime. The shah’s fall undermined the policy that had undergirded US strategy in the Middle East since the early 1970s. This “twin pillar” policy, first adopted by President Nixon, made provisions for the supply of military arms to Iran and Saudi Arabia. In return the two nations were to serve as pillars of strength and stability in the Persian Gulf region, though neither the support nor the expectations for each pillar was the same.2 While Iran was guaranteed access to some of the most sophisticated non-nuclear technology in the US military arsenal, American support for the Saudis was much more modest.3 Additionally, Iran was expected to provide proxy resistance to the Soviets and other sources of regional instability, whereas the Saudis were expected to help keep oil prices low and promote moderation in the Arab-Israeli dispute.4 The impetus for the twin-pillar approach can be traced back to two sources: the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 and the British withdrawal from east of the Suez in 1971. During the 1967 conflict (known as the chapter 4 62 Six Day War), the Soviets broke relations with the Israelis and began supporting the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). In turn, the United States replaced France as Israel’s largest benefactor. The decision by the superpowers to pair off on opposing sides to gain leverage in the Middle East transformed the Arab-Israeli dispute from a regional issue into a global affair.5 Initially, the United States relied heavily on the British to provide a foothold for Western interests in the region.6 But on 16 January 1968, known as “Black Tuesday,” Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced that Britain would relinquish its remaining holdings east of the Suez Canal by 1971. On 1 December 1971, Great Britain completed a withdrawal from the region it had begun in the late 1940s, with a departure from Greece, Turkey, India, and Palestine, followed by the Suez Canal in 1956. The United States responded to each step with policies intended to ensure that the vacuum left by the British was not...