Reagan on War: A Reappraisal of the Weinberger Doctrine, 1980-1984

5. The Shultz Doctrine: Using American Military Power to Support Diplomacy

5 t T HE SHU LT Z DOCTR IN E Using American Military Power to Support Diplomacy I n 1981, during the early weeks of the Reagan administration, Secretary of Defense Weinberger argued that domestic political realities made it unwise to use military power to overtly coerce Cuba. Specifically, he contended that public and congressional support would be absent because the military forces were not being called upon to secure a vital national interest. A year later, in 1982, the circumstances in Lebanon were such that the administration did have domestic support for deploying military forces to Beirut. Still, Weinberger argued that domestic political realities in that instance supported only a very limited use of military power and that political realities in the region were such that the nation should exercise caution in deploying forces lest it threaten its vital strategic interests in the Persian Gulf. In the end, the administration deployed US Marines in pursuit of a narrow and clearly articulated objective—to lend support to the Lebanese government as it escorted PLO fighters out of its territory—and the unit was to be redeployed as soon as that objective was met. Weinberger ’s concerns regarding domestic political realities, limited mandates , and vital strategic interests for the use of military power would The Shultz Doctrine 85 be overshadowed by the massacres at the PLO refugee camps in September 1982. The second round of US involvement in Lebanon further developed the evolution of the Reagan administration’s doctrine regarding the relationship between national political objectives, the use of American military power, and political realities in terms of strategic reappraisals. The administration deliberated whether to return the marines to Lebanon amid the political objectives sought in the region and the relationship between military power and policy objectives. It soon came to recognize that its original strategy was unlikely to succeed and that it needed to reappraise how it planned to use US diplomatic, economic, and military strength to achieve its objectives. What transpired was a series of strategic reappraisals beginning in October 1982 regarding strategy toward Lebanon, followed by another strategic appraisal almost a year later in September 1983. Each provides insight into how the administration sought to account for domestic and international political realities when deciding upon the use of military power in support of political objectives, marking further steps toward the promulgation of the Weinberger Doctrine. Relating American Military Power to Policy Objectives The chain of events leading to the massacre in the Palestinian refugee camps on 17 and 18 September 1982 began four days after the US Marines, having overseen the evacuation of the PLO from Lebanon, departed from Beirut.1 On 14 September, Bashir Gemayel, the Lebanese president-elect, was assassinated, prompting the Israelis to occupy West Beirut. The United States and the UN Security Council immediately demanded that the Israelis return to their previous positions , but their calls went unheeded.2 The actual perpetrators of the massacre were Phalangist Party militiamen, but many observers blamed the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) for allowing them to enter the camps.3 French officers who arrived shortly after the murders reported horrific chapter 5 86 carnage and were told by survivors that Israeli bulldozers had come in to push rubble over the bodies.4 After the reentry of the Israelis into Beirut and the massacre of the Palestinian refugees, many senior administration officials felt morally obligated to do something.5 Publicly, however, Reagan did not accept responsibility: “I don’t think that specifically there could [be] assigned a responsibility on our part for withdrawing our troops. They were sent in there with one understanding. They were there to oversee and make sure that the PLO left Lebanon. And that mission was completed, virtually without incident, and they left. Then, who could have foreseen the assassination of the President-elect that led to the other violence and so forth.”6 Nonetheless, the Arab League accused the United States of being “morally responsible for the massacre” and supported the PLO’s demand that a new international force be sent back into Beirut.7 Key administration leaders reached a similar conclusion and supported the assignment of US forces to a new MNF. During a conference call on 18 September, a recommendation by Secretary of State Shultz to reconstitute the MNF was backed by Edwin Meese, William Clark, and William Casey but opposed by Weinberger and Vessey...