The Rhetorical Presidency of George H. W. Bush

3: And the Wall Came Tumbling Down: Bush’s Rhetoric of Silence during German Reunification

C  And the Wall Came Tumbling Down: Bush’s Rhetoric of Silence during German Reunification    In early November  events of historical import were taking place in Germany . The Berlin Wall was being torn down, and refugees from throughout much of the Eastern Bloc were streaming into what was still known as West Germany to seek a new life of freedom. Yet the president of the United States said nothing. As the magnitude of the changes taking place in Germany and throughout Europe became clear, leaders in the American press and legislature called on George Bush to stand in Berlin to deliver a speech conveying the joy with which U.S. citizens viewed these events. Still, the president of the United States said nothing. As it became clear that the Soviet Union was losing its grip on Eastern Europe and that American allies in NATO would have to deal with profound changes, there was an outcry that George Bush make known his views on the events at hand. U.S. allies and enemies alike demanded to know how America would react to these revolutionary changes. Publicly, the president of the United States still said nothing. The November , , announcement that travel restrictions across Checkpoint Charlie had been lifted set off a euphoric celebration in Berlin. President Bush did not speak publicly on the matter until November —the day before Thanksgiving and nearly two weeks later. Secretary of State James Baker later explained Bush’s silence about the fall of the Berlin Wall this way: “In politics, words are the coin of the realm. Used judiciously, they can build political capital, coalesce a public consensus, or enrich a nation. But when frittered away or ineffectively employed, words in political life can bankrupt a candidate, sell out a policy, or even dissolve a government.”1 The Bush administration’s effort not to “fritter away” words on the occasion of the Wall’s fall met with heavy criticism. For two months leading up to the fall, Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell had been accusing President Bush of “timidity” in his handling of European affairs.2 Complaining of Bush’s lack of response to the fall of the Wall, Mitchell urged him to speak in Berlin and then call for a meeting of Western allies concerning the future of Europe.3 ThepressalsocomplainedthatBushwas“lackingeloquenceatahistorictime.”4 The New York Times even published a fictional version of a speech that Bush might have given to address the situation.5 Mary McGrory of the Washington Post said that the events in Berlin showed “Bush’s emotional wall,” and that perhaps he should prepare for the next similar event by “studying how to be giddy.”6 Bush was also the target of broader criticism of his foreign policy as a result of his decision not to speak about the events in Germany. One writer stated: “The Bush administration does seem to have a strategy of sorts, buried under the half-measures and bad syntax. In a more jingoistic era, it would be called ‘defeatism.’”7 U.S. News and World Report noted: “George Bush has never been considered much of a trendsetter, but after  months in office, he is adopting a foreign policy . . . by triage, based on the belief that America’s relative decline doesn’t matter because the victorious U.S. can and must concentrate its dwindling resources on the handful of international problems Americans care most about, such as drug trafficking and trade.”8 Perhaps the most direct criticism of Bush compared him to General George McClellan during the American Civil War: President Bush has been taking a pasting for his diffident, begrudging, initial reaction to the great events in Berlin and Eastern Europe. Similar criticisms have been leveled at him repeatedly throughout his first year in office. Collectively, they add up to the kind of complaint that a frustrated President Lincoln expressed about his unduly wary Union Army commander, Gen. George B. McClellan, the self-styled “Little Napoleon.” After yet another instance of McClellan being late to commit his vastly superior forces to battle with the Confederates, Lincoln remarked angrily of the general: “He’s got the slows.” Something similar can be said about Bush.9 To what end did President Bush endure this intense criticism of what opponents viewed as his failure to grasp the rhetorical situation with regard to Berlin? As Secretary Baker noted, the administration did not wish to waste words. George Bush’s own explanation, given some...