Yankee Division in the First World War: In the Highest Tradition

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{ 103 } The whole country breathed of war. —sgt. robert l. forbush 5 château-thierry(aisne-marne) setting the stage For the Yankee Division, the period from June 28 through August 4, 1918, encompassed two separate actions, the Champagne-Marne Operation, which was defensive, and the Aisne-Marne Offensive. Initially, the division took over an approximately 6,500- to 7,500-yard front that was then occupied by the 2nd Division, a Regular division, consisting of two regiments of Marines (5th and 6th) and two army regiments (9th and 23rd). Aside from the normal routine of settling into the sector, the division also had to prepare for the anticipated German counterattack that eventually took place over the course of three days, commencing July 15 and terminating on July 17. It would be Germany’s last offensive gasp. On July 18, the Allies went on the offensive, the object of which was to collapse the German salient, having its apex at a point just east of ChâteauThierry .Allalongthesidesofthatpocket,fromSoissonsontheAisne,south to Château-Thierry, from there easterly, and then northeasterly toward Reims , the Allies brought simultaneous pressure to bear. At the mouth of the pocket were the Aisne and Vesle rivers. The 26th Division was part of the French Sixth Army commanded by Gen. Jean Marie Joseph Degoutte. It would attack along an axis running from a point near Bouresches in a northeasterly direction, then shift to an easterly direction for a short distance , and finally, move once more in a northeasterly direction. The Yankee Division was referred to as the “pivot” since it was called upon to move forward and to change direction twice as the salient was being squeezed shut by the other attacking divisions. As it changed direction, it was critical 104 } chapter 5 that it “guide left,” or maintain contact with the division on its left, in this case, the French 167th Division. Also, as the advance continued along this axis, the front would narrow to approximately 3,300 yards. The maneuver was fraught with difficulties for the division, not the least of which was maintaining the contact of its own battalions each to the other, and the possibility that some units might get lost or intermingled in the confusion of the battle, which is precisely just what did happen. This would have been a difficult maneuver even for a veteran outfit, which it was not. During this same offensive, the 2nd Division would be called upon to perform a similar change in direction and the result was identical—confusion and loss of control, as well as the inability to locate certain units. Further complicating matters was the fact that the speed of the advance was tied directly to the progress (or lack of progress) of the French divisions advancing on either side, the 167th on the left (which along with the 26th Division formed Liggett’s I Corps) and the 39th (part of the French xxxviii Corps). Each of the French divisions had as its initial objective well-fortifiedhills,193and204respectively,fromwhichenfiladefirepoured into the flanks of the advancing Yankee battalions causing further casualties . For their part, the Germans were implementing new defensive tactics. In an effort to extract as many men and as much matériel as possible from the salient, they conducted a staged withdrawal, fiercely defended each interim line for a time, quietly melted away, and then set up at the next line. They employed artillery in conjunction with machine guns, but it was the use of the latter that took the heaviest toll. The cry “Kamerad,” especially from a machine gunner in the act of surrender, was a hated word, and very often the trigger for summary vengeance by a Yankee infantryman. As if that wasn’t enough, due to the inability of the adjacent French division to keep abreast, at about the midway point of the Yankee attack, Liggett ordered the 52nd Infantry Brigade to sideslip to the left and to take over a portion of the adjoining sector from the much slower 167th. The order was almost immediately countermanded, but that order did not reach all units before some of them had already moved left, thus compounding the confusion . Finally, considerable pressure was brought to bear on the division to maintain the attack, night or day, regardless of the fact that the advance may have carried the infantry beyond the range of the supporting artillery. getting settled in the sector...