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168 The announcement of Japan’s unconditional surrender on 15 August 1945 brought with it the appointment of Gen. Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (scap), as well as a dramatic change in mission for U.S. forces in the Pacific. Preparations for the projected invasion of the home islands ceased as sta=s at theater and army levels initiated Operation blacklist, a contingency plan for the occupation of Japan and parts of Korea should enemy resistance suddenly end. As its central task, the plan called for the disarmament and demobilization of the Japanese military, which maintained 4.9 million armed troops in the home islands alone. While forgoing the dreadful carnage contested landings would have likely entailed, blacklist was still a complex undertaking that included over twenty-two divisions, plus air and naval elements.1 This complexity involved much more than transporting men and equipment to Japan and stationing them throughout the country. As members of the occupation force, soldiers of the 112th faced a remarkable challenge. Only weeks after they had been concerned with simply killing or capturing the enemy on Luzon, the cavalrymen had to implement the terms of Tokyo’s surrender. E=ort spent gearing up for an assault on the beaches of Kyushu seemed unhelpful given the new assignment of occupation duty. Indeed, questions about what those specific duties would be created a great deal of anxiety for senior leaders. So did the prospect of moving about in a population comprising its former enemies. Yet Japanese cooperation made the environment a rather forgiving one for the troopers, despite gi missteps due to incompetence, unruliness, or cultural insensitivity. Not only did the rct’s fears prove unwarranted but the friendliness of local o

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