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(2) Reforming Consumer Protections Frank Sharp not only pushed me over the finish line in the attorney general ’s race. He also turned my otherwise “pumpkin” consumer protection proposals into one of the Cinderella’s coaches of the legislative session of 1973. Despite my oft-proven ability to coax jurors to “vote” for my client, I knew I would be shouting into the wind if I was forced to sell my consumer protection ideas to the legislature as it existed in 1971. Juries are supposed to be, and generally are, open to hearing both sides of an argument before they make a decision. Their job is to answer yes-or-no questions in a search for the truth. With legislators, the opposite is more often the case. They run for office based upon strongly held positions and spend their political capital advocating and defending those positions. The legislative process is no search for the truth. It is a Darwinesque survival of the fittest. “My mind’s made up—don’t try to confuse me with the facts” is their traditional humorous description of the reality of legislative committee hearings and floor debate. Those made-up minds, more often than not, are greatly influenced by the sources of political power legislators rely upon to get elected. Those sources might be hometown business leaders, the local coffee shop crowd, Austin lobbyists, a local political clique, or a combination of those sources. It is seldom the average Joe or Jane that is uppermost in legislators’ minds. And those were the folks whom I was trying to help in my consumer protection proposal. In 1971, a consumer protection bill that was not as far-reaching as the one I proposed was treated like a mouse in a cat den—tossed around for amusement and then disposed of. It enjoyed a modicum of support among the Senate’s urban members but found zero backing in the House and garnered no interest from the attorney general or governor. Consumer advocates were offered polite hearings and then ignored.1 (18) Chapter 2 Two years and a governmental scandal later, my views on consumer legislation jumped to the top of business lobbyists’ list of potential problems . Consumer advocates who were smugly dismissed two years ago now found legislators and their staffs expressing serious interest in exploring the reformers’ ideas. The ripples from Frank Sharp’s splash were still rocking the governmental boat. The voters’ housecleaning to remove top officeholders in Austin was accompanied by a record turnover of state legislators. In a typical election , about one-third of the 150 House members and maybe 4 or 5 of the 31 senators are replaced. In 1972, the Sharpstown scandal helped remove 76 House members and 15 senators. Another change agent was that in 1971 a reapportionment replaced countywide elections for House members in the three largest counties with election by neighborhood-sized districts.2 These new districts opened opportunities for minority and other liberal candidates whose election in 1972 contributed to the moderation of the usually conservative House.3 The House turnover also ensured the election of a progressive House Speaker, Price Daniel Jr. of Liberty. Daniel often played his politics close to his vest, just as his father had. But he owed his election to the “Dirty Thirty” coalition of reformers who braved the dictatorial reign of Speaker Mutscher to clamor for an investigation of the Sharpstown scandal. My consumer legislation was a top priority for the reformers, and Daniel was ready to give the bill his blessing. The business lobby clearly faced some busy times when this new crew took office in January 1973. Election of a governor, attorney general, presiding officers of both houses, and half of the legislators having minimal influence from lobbyists was unprecedented in modern times. Business lobbyists’ problem solving traditionally involved one telephone call to the lieutenant governor or the Speaker to rein in a troublesome legislator . Now they were forced to go hat-in-hand to individual legislators— many of whom they had opposed during the election—to protect their interests. Because these lobbyists no longer claimed the ear of the presiding officers and because the presiding officers’ leadership styles called for delegating much more power to the members, their opinions were no longer automatically treated as gospel by the new legislators. Facts and information gained new respect in the marketplace of decision making. Good-ol’-boy connections suffered a decline in influence. This new openness was a key ingredient in...

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