Combat Ready?: The Eighth U.S. Army on the Eve of the Korean War

Notes

Chapter 1 1. Doris M. Condit, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, vol. 2, The Test of War, 1950– 1953, 53; General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences, 336. 2. Roy K. Flint, “Task Force Smith and the 24th Infantry Division: Delay and Withdrawal, 5–19 July 1950,” in America’s First Battles 1776–1965, ed. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stoft, 266–99. See also Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950–1953, 101–103; Jonathan M. House, Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century, 185ff. 3. Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, United States Army in the Korean War series, 73–74, 77–82, 92–100, 132–37; Blair, Forgotten War, 168; James L. Stokesbury , A Short History of the Korean War, 58ff. 4. Col. William J. Davies, “Task Force Smith: A Leadership Failure?” study project, U.S. Army War College, 66; “Why Are We Taking a Beating?” Life 29, no. 4 (July 24, 1950), 21. 5. Letter, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) W. W. Dick to Clay Blair, December 14, 1984, Folder “24th/25th Divisions,” Forgotten War Papers, Clay and Joan Blair Collection, U.S. Army Military History Institute (USAMHI), Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; Sam Boal, “New Soldiers for New Tasks,” New York Times Magazine, July 23, 1950, 7–9, 40–42; Bill Davidson, “The New G.I. Joe: He Never Had It So Good,” Collier’s 126, no. 14 (September 30, 1950), 24–25, 71–75. 6. Compton Pakenham, “Green Men under Fire,” Newsweek 36, no. 3 (July 17, 1950), 16–18; Carl Mydans, “It’s One Ration. Save It, Boys,” Life 29, no. 2 (July 17, 1950), 22–23; Frank Gibney, “Advance Patrol Pushes Up through Enemy Fire,” Life 29, no. 2 (July 17, 1950), 36–37. Cf. Harold Levin, “Hell Country: Of Mud, Muck, and Human Excrement . . . ,” Newsweek 36, no. 6 (August 7, 1950), 20–21; W. H. Lawrence, “A Day in the Life of a Platoon,” New York Times Magazine, September 10, 1950, 13, 70. 7. Bevin Alexander, Korea: The First War We Lost, 46. Like Appleman, Alexander served as a U.S. Army historian in Korea in 1951 and 1952. Paul M. Edwards, To Acknowledge a War, 28ff. 8. Matthew B. Ridgway interview, Senior Officer Oral History Program, Combat Leadership in Korea series, U.S. Army Military History Institute; Col. John T. Corley, “Lean and Hungry Soldiers,” Combat Forces Journal 1, no. 12 (July 1951), 16–18; Eugene Kinkead, In Every War but One, 211ff; Edwards, To Acknowledge a War, 59. The army’s own research showed that fewer than 20 percent of nonveteran volunteers named “travel, adventure, or new experiences ” as their primary motivation for enlisting in the late 1940s. Thirty percent named the opportunity for vocational experience as the dominant factor (thus validating Corley’s criticism to a certain degree). Veterans overwhelmingly attributed their return to the army to a n o t e s 119 120 desire for economic and employment security. Data from Maj. Paul D. Guernsey, “New Army, New Soldiers,” Army Information Digest 3, no. 5 (May 1948), 26–30. 9. Russell F. Weigley, A History of the United States Army, provides the most concise summary , 502–504. See also James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, United States Army in the Korean War series, 42–62; D. Clayton James, Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea, 1950–1953, 1–8; Donald A. Carter, “From G.I. to Atomic Soldier: The Development of U.S. ArmyTactical Doctrine, 1945–1956,” Ph.D. diss.,The Ohio State University, 1987, 14–53. 10. Keith D. McFarland and David L. Roll, Louis Johnson and the Arming of America: The Roosevelt and Truman Years, 188ff., 204 (chapter 12, “Like a Meatchopper on Roundsteak,” provides the most concise synopsis of Johnson’s impact on the Defense Department budget); “Why Are We Taking a Beating?” Life 29, no. 4 (July 24, 1950), 21. 11. Matthew B. Ridgway and Harold H. Martin, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway, 165, 190. Ridgway knew better than to cast stones at Walker. In his final report to the secretary of the army in 1948, Eisenhower warned that the army as then constituted could not conduct wartime operations. See Carter, “From G.I. to Atomic Soldier,” 16. The Doolittle Board, convened in 1945, was charged with “ironing out the iniquities [sic] that were alleged to exist at the time between the officer and the enlisted men...