Danger Close

Preface

America had a secret weapon. Ironically, America didn’t realize it had this secret weapon until the events of  September  plunged the nation into the War on Terror. Because of the unique circumstances of the fight to oust the Taliban from Afghanistan, America’s opening move sent small teams of Special Forces to link up with a loose-knit confederation of Afghan rebels. Initially this move was meant to pave the way for much larger follow-on conventional forces, but when the Afghan rebels and SOF teams started rolling up the Taliban by themselves, U.S. military leaders capitalized on their success, and the rebel-SOF combination became the main effort. When the success of this unlikely force continued, to the point of bringing down the entire Taliban regime, people looked closer at what made it work so well. What they found was a catalyst of air power experts—air force personnel who direct airstrikes against enemy ground forces—and that began the dawning awareness of this secret weapon. This group of experts, collectively known as TACPs for the Tactical Air Control Parties in which they work, exists in a twilight world caught between two services—held at arm’s length by the air force, not fully embraced by the army. In Afghanistan and Iraq, however, they played a critical role in bringing down two murderous regimes despite overwhelming odds. In fact, to a significant degree, the shocking speed with which the Taliban and Hussein regimes collapsed was due to the role played by this small group. This is their story. It is not the history of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; in fact, technically speaking, it is not even a history of those wars. It is simply one piece of the bigger picture, but one that has been largely untold up to this point. It is told in their own words to give these men a chance to speak for themselves about what they did and what they were thinking. In the process, what emerges is not only a story of heroism and sacrifice but also one of incredible ingenuity and a glimpse into how and why these men have transformed modern warfare. There is also another side to this story: The history of close air supPreface xiv Preface port, or CAS, is inextricably linked to the TACP story. CAS is the use of airstrikes in close proximity to friendly ground forces, usually because they are engaged with the enemy. One reason the TACP potential remained secret for so long is that in the wake of Desert Storm, when that capability really took shape, the army and the air force each developed its own unique vision of how the ideal war ought to be fought, and CAS did not figure in either vision. This is where I enter the story. I spent the last twelve years of my air force career caught up in the CAS controversy. After eight years as an air force pilot, primarily flying B-s, I went off to graduate school, where as a budding military historian I took a keen interest in the development and evolution of air power. The United States’ air power debate is full of contention, with several groups each believing it alone had the true vision, and after many decades of acrimonious debate, feelings and opinions had hardened into genuine animosity. On the one side, the air force had been dominated by bomber and fighter pilots —both of whom rejected CAS. On the other side, the army, which in theory embraced CAS, in reality had become so bitter toward airmen that nothing the air force did was right, and operationally the army retreated into a “go it alone” attitude. My interest in the air power vision debates culminated in a dissertation written on a related subject. After completing my Ph.D., I went to work at the Pentagon in an air staff think tank that helped shape air power strategy, concepts, and doctrine. Because of my military history expertise, I ended up working primarily on projects related to integrating air and ground power. The more I immersed myself in the competing ground and air perspectives, though, the more I realized that both the army and the air force had entrenched themselves in ideas shaped as much by partisan thinking as by facts and experience. I also became acquainted with a small group of reformers who pointed to new capabilities and called for a new focus for air power—one...