Son Tay Raid: American POWs in Vietnam Were Not Forgotten, Revised Edition

Chapter Three: Preparations in Southeast Asia

] 102 [ ] Chapter Three [ Preparations in Southeast Asia The deployment of our Joint Contingency Task Group to Southeast Asia is perhaps the least known phase of the Son Tay raid. Accounts about the raid focus on the rigorous training and meticulous planning in Florida and omit the way we sneaked into the combat zone and upstaged the regular troops there by pulling off the biggest surprise of the Vietnam War. We planned and trained well, but once ready, we were still halfway around the world from our target. For the raid to be a success, we had to enter the war zone undetected by the enemy and avoid attracting any undue scrutiny from the U.S. forces whose unquestioned assistance we needed. It was challenging to solicit support from several key theater units whose commanders were told that they did not need to know what we intended to do with their resources. Because all normal means of communications for this mission were forbidden, only a few planners coordinated with these unit commanders on a face-to-face basis. In spite of the unprecedented demand on their units’ assets, all commanders rose to the occasion and did what was expected of them. Carrier Availability? A very curious event occurred just before Brigadier Generals Blackburn and Manor departed for Vietnam with Colonel Simons to present the POW rescue plan to the key leaders in the field. Blackburn discovered what he believed to be a significant glitch in the reliance placed on the Navy in the Gulf of Tonkin. Mid-November was the time period when aircraft carriers were scheduled for replacement by newcomers from the States. He did not want this rotation to take place during our moon phase window. Nor did he want pilots who had just arrived in the theater and lacked seasoned experience in the area to undertake a highly sensitive support mission. He took this dilemma to his boss, Air Force Lt. Gen. preparations in southeast asia ] 103 [ John Vogt, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Director of Operations. Blackburn was well aware of our planning focus on using pilots who were experienced in the current war zone environment. That is why we mixed Jolly Green Giant helicopter and Skyraider fighter pilots from Southeast Asia with highly qualified stateside veterans. The only thing these trained crews needed were aircraft from combat units in Thailand. That was Blackburn’s mindset when he, not understanding the ties between the aircraft carriers and their air wings, suggested that pilots of the departing USS America (CVA-66) be transferred to the USS Ranger (CVA-61) at Subic Bay in the Philippines so that her area-experienced aviators could fly from the Ranger’s deck once that carrier got to Yankee Station. He also wanted the Navy to accelerate the arrival of the aircraft carriers USS Ranger and USS Hancock (CVA-19) at Yankee Station and to delay the departure of the USS Oriskany (CVA-34) until after the completion of the raid. Vogt assured Blackburn that he would get the problem fixed.1 Blackburn took him at his word and then, in spite of his sudden concern over this apparent planning oversight, did not even mention it to Manor and Simons throughout their long coordinating trip to Hawaii and Vietnam. With that glitch, the concept of supporting the raid with resources readily available in the Gulf of Tonkin was put to the test. Normally, Task Force 77 (TF 77) had three carriers under its operational control. Of these three, one could be at Subic Bay undergoing routine maintenance with her staff performing shore duties and enjoying well-deserved rest and recuperation from the war zone. Another could be sent out to conduct a naval operation within the Seventh Fleet’s domain. Such an operation might be nothing more than an occasional show of the U.S. flag in a foreign port. This in-theater scheduling did not degrade the capability of the Navy to wage the war with only two on-line carriers. What Blackburn and the Joint Chiefs saw in Washington was that there were only two carriers in the Gulf at the time of their discovery about the carrier deployment schedule and that the USS America was scheduled to depart on 8 November , leaving the USS Oriskany as the lone carrier until the arrival of the USS Hancock and the USS Ranger. The USS Hancock departed North Island Naval Air Station (NAS), San Diego, on 22 October, and the USS...