The Historiographical Jesus: Memory, Typology, and the Son of David

2. Hermeneutics and History

17 P 2 Hermeneutics and History In this chapter I follow a particular thread of ideas about hermeneutics and history as they have developed in historiography. For the sake of space and focus, I highlight a selection of important shifts in this development: My first section (1) examines the historiographical presuppositions of Benedict Spinoza, (2) compares the dichotomies at work in the thinking of Gotthold Lessing and Leopold von Ranke, (3) discusses the hermeneutical circle and the key contributors to this concept, including Schleiermacher and Heidegger, and (4) critiques the conception of history in the work of Rudolf Bultmann. In this way, I aim to set the stage for chapter 3, which discusses contemporary memory theory. Over the course of this book, I assume three premises. In this chapter, I discuss these with an aim to build from this foundation in the chapters that follow: A. If perceptions are to be remembered then they will inevitably be interpreted, subconsciously, consciously, or both. B. Perceptions that contribute to historical memory are thus always interpreted along each stage of the tradition that they inhabit. C. The historian is never able to interpret an uninterpreted past. My most central thesis is not addressed in full until chapter 3. Therefore I have listed these three positions as premises rather than conclusions. However, as with all premises, each could be seen as a conclusion in its own right— hence the necessity of the present chapter. Because this chapter is largely a survey of selected historiographical ideas, I do not attempt to structure what follows into three neatly contained sections that coincide with each of my three premises. Rather, I tease out the issues related to my three premises as I work through this survey. 18 The Historiographical Jesus 1 R. G. Collingwood (1889–1943) and G. M. Trevelyan (1876–1962). 2 This was prefigured by Dilthey’s notion that perceptions of the past are filtered through the historian’s worldview (H. A. Hodges, Wilhelm Dilthey [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969], esp. 228). See the discussion in R. C. Solomon, Continental Philosophy since 1750: The Rise and Fall of the Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 106. 3 By “early” I mean that Spinoza’s work was an antecedent to the hermeneutical concerns of the Enlightenment and thereafter. 4 And thereby undermine the church’s use of Scripture for political sway. See S. Preus, Spinoza and the Irrelevance of Biblical Authority (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1–33, esp .4–6. 5 Translation from B. Spinoza, The Chief Works (New York: Dover, 1951). Interpreting Interpretation The reader will notice that premise C employs the word “interpret” twice. I here grant that the historian’s primary role is that of interpreter. This, of course, is an uncontroversial position among contemporary historiographers. What I aim to emphasize is that the ancient perceivers of events and figures were themselves interpreters. As such, historical memory is from the very beginning the product of interpretation. While this point is often acknowledged , ultimately historiographers have been preoccupied with the nature of their own task. Historiography since Collingwood and Trevelyan1 has increasingly centered on the theories and methods employed by the contemporary interpreter.2 I view the self-reflection of historians on their roles as interpreters to be essential and have no desire to undermine this progress. Rather, I wholeheartedly agree and refocus my own discussion onto the role that interpretation played for the first perceivers of history, on whose memories historical data were first based. Thus, to fill out premise C, I take for granted that historical memory exists first in the interpretations of the ancient perceivers and only then in the subsequent interpretations of historians. With this in mind I begin with Spinoza. Spinoza and Scripture Benedict (Baruch) Spinoza (1632–1677) provides a window into the early concern for biblical hermeneutics,3 and by inference, the philosophy of history . The chief aim of Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus was to combat what he considered the abuse of Scripture at the hands of the church.4 Spinoza accused the church of using the Bible to justify doctrine and thereby attributed to the Holy Spirit “every result of their diseased imagination” (7:7).5 His solution to this problem was to study Scripture by the same principles as one studies nature, with pure intellect and without emotion. Spinoza writes: Hermeneutics and History 19 6 Spinoza claims that biblical Scripture “is...