On Moderation: Defending an Ancient Virtue in a Modern World

Conclusion

113 8 CONCLUSION I do not suppose that this inquiry has resolved all questions. Here I will revisit, briefly, a few of the points I’ve been most interested in making— with a view to entertaining some critical questions you might still want to raise. Chapter 1 explored consequences of the important reality that “you cannot get it all” from any social arrangements, no matter how well conceived . Hence, statesmanship must weigh and balance inevitably competing goods and interests, with the result that, in one degree or another, concessions are made and compromises achieved. This reality can be denied or obfuscated in two ways; that is, in this regard there are two modes of extremism. I could insist upon maximizing one good (individual rights or civic order, for example), because I refuse to recognize that significant desiderata are at variance with my desideratum; this is absolutism. Or I could naively suppose that we can get it all, and that only on account of very unjust institutions and exploitive persons we don’t have a society fulfilling our every moral aspiration; this is utopianism. Absolutism and utopianism are fertile sources for a politics of righteous rage. But aren’t we entitled, even obliged, to be angry about some political situations? Yes, but not on absolutist or utopian grounds. 114 / On Moderation Political moderation is sometimes identified with lack of principled conviction. That is inaccurate; you can, and should, have more than one principle. You might want to call attention to occasions where one precept clearly ought to take precedence over others. But in these cases, prudence usually dictates that the others be kept in view as limiting or qualifying factors. For example, the freedom to assemble and demonstrate collectively in protest of public policies is central in a liberal democracy, but public tranquility and private property rights are not to be forgotten (demonstrations how and where?). Another example comes from the currently agitated issue of national security and civil liberties. The kind of mentality I’m calling moderation will always consider both of these vital imperatives , though it will also be much aware of critical circumstances bearing upon them. This mentality is able to acknowledge circumstances dictating the priority of national security, but when doing so it will continue to take account of the civil liberties side of the equation. A final illustration: in a democracy, claims made on behalf of civic equality are frequently entitled to trump competing claims. But the following is too much trumping: during the French Revolution, radicals marched in the streets proclaiming, “We will have equality or we will destroy civilization.” They meant total substantive equality right now. A critic of my rationale for moderation might offer this challenge: “What you advance as a case for moderation is really a case for conservatism . Its emphasis on the dangers of political idealism counsels a readiness to accept many social imperfections, even sizeable ones, and, by implication at least, a disposition in favor of traditionally hallowed institutions and ways of doing things. That is conservative.” This claim is worth consideration . In some respects the line of argument in my first chapter does point in a conservative direction. While allowing for reformist politics, it takes a dim view of transformationism and stresses limitations rooted in our human and social condition. And, as the critic would be anxious to observe, the conservative position is problematic, insofar as history shows us how highly valued alterations in our social condition have been inspired by single-minded absolutists who turned a blind eye to considerations in competition with their cherished ideal. One answer is that at least as often the absolutist posture has wreaked havoc, and its usual tendency is to render desirable compromise impossible. But I would rather Conclusion / 115 call attention to respects in which the position taken in these essays may point in a liberal direction. As frequently indicated, a significant element in moderate leadership is its nondogmatic character; the leader is aware of the fact that there exists a plurality of goods to be sought and evils to be avoided. This awareness of different perspectives for which legitimacy may be claimed is a kind of open-mindedness, and open-mindedness is a liberal virtue; at least it is a virtue extolled in historic Western liberalism . Open-mindedness has its problems, which I’ve noted from time to time, and of which Nietzsche is the most powerful expositor...