The Schooled Heart: Moral Reformation in American Higher Education

Chapter 7. Could Humility Be a Deliberative Virtue?

155 Could Humility Be a Deliberative Virtue? For much of the twentieth century, academic orthodoxy proclaimed that colleges and universities were not conduits of moral pedagogy. Here academic convention follows the tradition of John Stuart Mill, who said that the task of the modern university is not to tell students what to believe or how to live, “but to give [them] information and training, and help [them] form [their] own beliefs in a manner worthy of intelligent beings.”1 In order for students to make informed choices about important philosophical , ethical, and social matters, the academy must refrain from advocating substantive conceptions of the good life. Moreover, a professor cannot allow her prejudices to interfere with students’ intellectual autonomy. Instead, she must help students cultivate those skills that will prepare them to make choices they deem necessary for a well-lived life. Today, however, the idea that moral advocacy has no place in education is not as widely shared as it once was. Even self-described liberal theorists have come to reject the idea that moral neutrality in education is something for which educators ought to strive. According to Amy Gutmann , all theories of education will involve substantive moral conceptions , and those conceptions will not be neutral with respect to the kinds sShawn D. Floyd Chapter 7 156 Could Humility Be a Deliberative Virtue? of virtues students ought to develop.2 Instead of devising impartial pedagogical practices, many liberal theorists encourage a forthright endorsement of their most cherished ideals. For them, a salient objective of education is to prepare students to contribute to—and flourish in—a society in which its citizens collectively embrace the foundational principles of democracy. For this reason, our educational institutions ought to promote distinctively democratic virtues. While it may be difficult to develop an exhaustive list of democratic virtues, we can at least call attention to those that recur in the literature: tolerance, civility, honesty, the ability to engage in rational inquiry, respect for persons, and any excellence that enables one to function well in a socially and intellectually diverse environment.3 These excellences rightly enjoy a privileged position among liberal theorists’ moral repertoire . After all, the strident nature and large number of moral disagreements in public life constantly threaten to undermine productive debate and political consensus. In an effort to offset the contentious nature of these disputes, we need habits that promote goodwill, cooperative inquiry, and respectful disagreement. Gutmann refers to these habits as “deliberative virtues” and suggests that democratic education is an ideal environment in which to cultivate them.4 Thus she advocates a model of pedagogy that encourages “rigorous, honest, open, and intense intellectual discussions, both inside and outside the classroom.”5 For it is by means of respectful disagreement and patient adjudication of opposing views that one comes to embody democracy’s most prized ideals.6 I profess some camaraderie with those liberal theorists who reject the myth of moral neutrality in education. I also affirm their efforts to identify virtues central to democratic education. As a Catholic Christian who is heavily invested in these issues, I am naturally interested in the role theological virtues might play in democratic education’s pedagogical repertoire . Could virtues that are traditionally aligned with or emerge from religious commitments be placed alongside the virtues of the liberal academy ? Responses to this question will range from ambivalence to incredulity. According to some liberal theorists, theologically oriented ideals are unduly sectarian and unlikely to produce civility, respect for rational inquiry, and similar traits thought to strengthen democratic practices . I wish to challenge this claim. I will argue that the virtue of humility , although inspired by the Christian moral tradition, is necessary (though perhaps not sufficient) to foster and sustain the practices Gutmann claims are central to democratic education. More specifically, I will argue that humility should itself be considered a deliberative virtue. In developing my argument, I will focus primarily on Thomas Aquinas’ understanding of humility.7 Aquinas provides one of the most thorough accounts of humility one can find within the Christian tradi- Shawn D. Floyd 157 tion. Also, that account is especially illuminative for my general thesis. Aquinas’ account of humility not only complements the democratic virtues extolled by the academy, it seems necessary for their realization. The modesty of this claim ought not to minimize its apparent implication : in an effort to achieve the ends to which democratic...