Religion as Social Capital: Producing the Common Good

3. Religious Social Capital: Its Nature, Social Location, and Limits

It has become now almost a cliché that religion in the United States generates more “social capital” than any other American institution. The sociological evidence linking religion to social capital seems overwhelming. For example, twothirds of all small groups in America are directly connected with churches and synagogues (Wuthnow 1994b, 56-57). Likewise, two-thirds of those active in social movements in America claim that they draw on religious motivation for their involvement (Cunningham 1995, 97). As Wuthnow states in his national study of student volunteers in America, “churches and synagogues remain the primary place where instruction is given about the spiritual dimension of caring ” (Wuthnow 1996b, 9). While there is considerable evidence that indicates that religion is a major generator of social capital, there still remain a variety of questions with regard to the manner and extent to which it does so. This chapter analyzes the social capital generated through religion—its nature, location, and limits. First, it briefly presents some of the empirical evidence that suggests religion disproportionately generates social capital and holds considerable democratic potential . In this first section of the essay, we ask why this might be the case. Is there really some genuine special nexus between religion and social capital? Secondly, the chapter examines the sites for religious social capital—are they principally or exclusively local congregations? For example, beyond the social capital forged in congregations, do religious schools and other religious organiChapter 3 Religious Social Capital Its Nature, Social Location, and Limits John A. Coleman, S.J. 33 zations also generate social capital? In recent years there has been a huge upsurge of para-church special interest groups engaged in community organizing or lobbying (Wuthnow 1988, 100–31). Do such groups also play a crucial role in aggregating religious social capital? Finally, the chapter probes whether religious social capital has distinctive elements that serve to differentiate it from the kind of social capital produced by other civic associations or organizations. In trying to answer this question, the chapter identifies certain limits in the very metaphor of “social capital” and its difficulty in dealing with important qualitative variations between different kinds of groups. The chapter ends with a cautionary discussion of the limits that any expansionary investment of religious social capital may hold. THE DEMOCRATIC POTENTIAL OF RELIGION Churches regularly and straightforwardly act as communication networks that foster civic volunteerism. Princeton sociologist Robert Wuthnow puts it this way: “Religious organizations tell people of opportunities to serve, both within and beyond the congregation itself, and provide personal contacts, committees, phone numbers, meeting space, transportation or whatever it may take to help turn good intention into action” (Wuthnow 1994a, 242). Religiously motivated volunteers are more likely than the non-religious to employ a communitarian language to describe their involvement and to appeal to some sense of the common good rather than simply some individualistic language to explain their behavior (Wuthnow 1991, 325). People are more likely to give money and time, even to secular efforts, if they are church members (Wuthnow 1996, 87; see also Campbell & Yonish, Chapter 6 of this volume), and they are also significantly more likely to vote if they are church members (Wald, Kellstedt, & Leege 1993, 49). Even having neighbors who attend church can be a critical factor in predicting whether the youth in a neighborhood will have jobs, use drugs, or engage in criminal activity (Case & Katze 1991, 58); the social capital of churches, it seems, spills over beyond their members into whole neighborhoods . Glenn Loury has noted that “the reports of successful efforts at reconstruction of ghetto communities invariably reveal a religious institution or a set of devout believers at the center of the effort” (Schambra 1994, 32). This ability of church-based community organizing efforts to turn around low-income neighborhoods is further documented by the discussions of Warren (Chapter 4) and Wood (Chapter 5) in this volume. In fact, many Americans believe that churches and synagogues are better able than other institutions to deal with “the problems facing our city or local community.” In one Gallup survey, 57 percent of the respondents deemed churches to be more apt to deal with such problems than other social institutions , while less than a third thought local business, government, or political 34 Religious Social Capital parties were apt vehicles for “compassionate and just solutions to the problems of our local communities” (Emerging Trends 1990, 3–4). When American Christians think about matters...