Air Mobility: A Brief History of the American Experience

Introduction

xv Introduction Global air mobility is an American invention. During the course of the twentieth century, other nations developed capabilities to transport supplies and personnel by air in support of military forces already on the battlefield. A few countries, mainly the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and Great Britain, fielded airlift forces capable of moving infantry divisions over distances of a few hundred miles and delivering them by parachute or directly from aircraft landed at rough forward fields. But only the United States mustered the resources and will to create a global force of transport and aerial refueling aircraft capable of moving whole air and ground combat forces of all types to any region of the world and then supporting them in continuous combat operations. The end product of nearly a century of operational and doctrinal experience and investment, these forces can lay down an “aluminum bridge” involving thousands of aircraft and the requisite support and control structures between the homeland and/or distant regions in mere days, even hours. No other country can do that or has even really tried. Global air mobility changed the world. Most obviously, it elevated the American military’s penchant for speed and maneuverability to an unequalled art. Since World War II, it is fair to say that every major U.S. strategic concept and regional war plan has presumed substantial reliance on air mobility. Whether contemplating a bomber campaign against the Soviet Union or halting another North Korean surprise attack, American war planners depended on transport and tanker aircraft to launch, reinforce, and sustain operations. Even privates know of no other way to travel between routine assignments or to go into battle over distances of a few hundred miles or so. Less obviously, global air mobility changes the way the United States relates to the world. American leaders use air mobility to signal friends and enemies of their intent and ability to intervene, attack, or defend on short notice and powerfully. Air wings and armored brigades sitting in the United States on Sunday can be patrolling the air of any continent on Wednesday and taking up defensive positions on a friend’s borders by Friday. The knowledge that the United States can do those things affects the diplomacy and the calculations of America and its friends and enemies alike. Introduction xvi It also is worth noting that the very possession of global mobility has made America the world’s philanthropist. Knowing that the United States has the capability, the world expects that America will send military transport aircraft loaded with relief supplies and eager helpers wherever things go badly wrong in distant and remote places. Indeed, from their earliest days, American airlift forces have performed thousands of missions to deliver hay to snowbound cattle, get stranded pilgrims to Mecca, bring food and medicine to tsunamistricken towns, and do a host of other things that no one could have anticipated before they happened. Tens, perhaps hundreds, of thousands of people owe their lives to the speed at which U.S. air mobility forces brought relief. Indeed, even though humanitarian operations are merely a by-product of capabilities developed for military purposes, they are a frequent and profoundly positive feature of America’s outreach to the world. There is more to the story. Beyond development and operations, the global airlift story includes protracted and convoluted themes of doctrinal and political dispute. Doctrinally, it took decades for the full potential and resource requirements of air mobility to become clear and, then, for a small community of proponents to influence defense policies accordingly. Senior air leaders stalled progress for several decades by refusing to acknowledge or fund airlift missions beyond providing logistics support to deployed forces and enhancing the mobility and striking power of strategic air forces. Frustrated by the Air Force’s reluctance to maintain strong theater or battlefield airlift forces, the U.S. Army reestablished an aviation arm of its own in the 1950s that further complicated the political, not to mention the operational, scenes. Added to that, the airline industry and its supporters aggressively sought shares of the nation’s airlift effort, since many peacetime and wartime airlift missions could be performed by civilians flying airliners. At times, therefore, airlift politics rose to national importance, were Byzantine in their complexity, and revealed much about the competing strategic priorities and the internal rivalries of the American defense community. No clear appreciations of the history and the potentials of global airlift are possible apart from these doctrinal...