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262 23. The 1990s Years of Steady-State Surge At first glance, “steady-state surge” reads as an oxymoron. But by the end of the 1990s, the term had specific meaning for the Air Mobility Command (AMC) and for the U.S. Air Force in general. Basically, “surge” meant a pace of operations that precluded adequate rest for the command’s personnel and the proper maintenance or replacement of its aircraft and other resources.1 Like an athlete in training, AMC needed rest between periods of intense activity to accomplish the “housekeeping” activities needed to maintain readiness in relation to its overarching obligation to support American forces during major conflicts. But following the First Gulf War, AMC entered a seemingly endless series of crises and conflicts that gave it and its people too few opportunities for rest and recovery. By the end of the decade, the debilitating effects of this condition of steady-state surge on training, personnel retention, staff manning, aircraft, and supporting units were matters of daily concern for AMC and the Air Force. After a decade of the national airlift system being ridden hard and put away wet, its capabilities in relation to the demands it faced had deteriorated—not by much but noticeably. Obligations and Capabilities at Decade’s Start Riding on the crest of modernization programs started in the 1980s and the experience of the First Gulf War, AMC’s predecessor organization, the Military Airlift Command (MAC), was in good shape in 1991. Against the 66 million ton miles per day (MTMD) capacity goal set by the 1981 Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study, AMC’s theoretical capacity had reached 54 MTMD. The command was well exercised and had just delivered a sterling performance during the Gulf War. Its commander, General Hansford T. Johnson, was both commander of MAC and the commander in chief of the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). The Department of Defense (DOD) had just given him full combatant authority over TRANSCOM’s three “modal” commands: MAC, the Military Traffic Management Command, and the Military Sealift Command. His dual-hat responsibilities also gave MAC access to the highest 263 The 1990s halls of defense policy and reason to expect steady funding in a time of budgetary retrenchment.2 In terms of matériel, the C-5, C-130, and C-141 fleets were showing signs of age but generally were in good condition and reliable.3 The KC-135 fleet was definitely showing signs of age, but MAC’s main focus would be on airlift programs during the decade. There were reasons, however, for worry. As discussed in chapter 20, the C-17 program was lagging and in danger of cancellation if the McDonnell Douglas Corporation did not clean up the program’s financial and technical problems. The possibility of further delays in the C-17 program raised the specter of the C-141 fleet wearing out before its replacement came on line. Hard use over three decades had aged the Starlifters ahead of expectations, and they were becoming increasingly costly to maintain. Even if McDonnell Douglas worked a miracle , there was no doubt that the Starlifters would be in the boneyard well before enough C-17s came on line to replace their lost capacity. Worse, the 120 C-17s currently on the Air Force’s purchase list would replace only the C-141 fleet’s existing capacity, without moving AMC closer to the 66 MTMD bogey.4 Meanwhile , the Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet (CRAF) program was staggering from the liquidation of Pan American Airways and the looming departure of other major airlines, like American and United. Then there was the problem of finding money to replace the hundreds of Vietnam-era forklifts and “K-loaders” in the materials-handling equipment inventory. Their poor condition had disrupted and even jeopardized the airlift flow during the Gulf War. All things considered , then, AMC was in good operating form at the start of the 1990s, but its long-term condition would depend in large part on the demands placed on it and the availability of money to modernize its equipment. The Surge That Would Not Stop To understand what was about to happen to the airlift command, one needs to appreciate that it did not have a lot of surplus airlift capacity sitting around on the parking ramps of its bases. Day in and day out, the airlift fleet was engaged fully. A percentage of aircraft were away from their home stations performing prescheduled, special assignment...

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