-
4. The American Way: War Without Politics
- University of Nebraska Press
- Chapter
- Additional Information
103 The American W The American W The American W The American W The American Way ay ay ay ay: : : : : W W W W War W ar W ar W ar W ar Without Politics ithout Politics ithout Politics ithout Politics ithout Politics 4 4 4 4 4 In 2003, shortly after President George W. Bush declared the termination of major U.S. combat operations in Iraq, the neo-imperialist Max Boot declared that the American victory was “one of the signal achievements in military history .” Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), even when placed beside the stunning German blitzkrieg against France in 1940, he said, made “such fabled generals as Erwin Rommel and Heinz Guderian seem positively incompetent by comparison .” Boot conceded that Iraqi forces “were not all that formidable to begin with,” that they were demoralized, poorly trained, badly equipped, and incompetently led, all of which would seem to argue against OIF as a signal achievement in military history and Tommy Franks as the twenty-first century’s American Heinz Guderian. Boot nonetheless asserted that the United States had perfected a new way of war relying on “speed, maneuver, flexibility, and surprise” to achieve “quick victory with minimal casualties”1—a fair description, it would seem, of the German victory of 1940. Curiously, the gushing Boot mentioned neither OIF’s failure to deliver the U.S. political objective in Iraq nor the insurgency that was beginning to erupt in that country. (Three years after the launching of OIF, Boot lamented the “horrifying and inexplicable failure to undertake adequate preparation for the running of Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein” and declared that the “most criticized aspect of this failure—and rightly so—was not sending enough troops to control a population of 25 million.” He then proposed “a thorough spring cleaning at the Department of Defense.”2) BEA BEA BEA BEA BEATING GOLIA TING GOLIA TING GOLIA TING GOLIA TING GOLIATH TH TH TH TH 104 This book so far has focused on factors that analysts regard as common to many, perhaps most, stronger-side defeats by materially weaker adversaries. But, of course, no two stronger sides are alike: each has its own history, culture, and way of war. Are there distinctive aspects of America’s history, culture, and way of war that further disadvantage a democratic United States in wars against a materially weaker irregular foe with superior will and strategy? I believe there are at least two. The first is theAmerican tendency to separate war and politics— to view military victory as an end in itself, ignoring war’s function as an instrument of policy. The second is the U.S. military’s profound aversion to counterinsurgency. Both combine to form a recipe for politically sterile uses of force, especially in limited wars involving protracted hostilities against weaker irregular opponents. Much has been written about America’s strategic culture and way of war. Both derive from a variety of factors, including national political culture, geography , historical military experience, and comparative strategic advantages and preferences . Particular factors shapingAmerica’s strategic culture include geographic isolation from Europe, success in subjugating a vast continental wilderness, hemispheric domination, an ideology of democratic expansionism and national exceptionalism, and a persistent isolationist impulse. These and other factors, argued the highly respected British strategist Colin S. Gray in an exceptionally insightful 2005 essay, have produced a strategic culture—more specifically, an “American way of war”—having twelve specific characteristics: 1. Apolitical: Americans are wont to regard war and peace as sharply distinctive conditions. The U.S. military has a long history of waging war for the goal of victory, paying scant regard to the consequences of the course of its operations for the character of the peace that will follow. 2. Astrategic: Strategy is, or should be, the bridge that connects military power with policy. When Americans wage war as a largely autonomous activity, leaving worry about peace and its politics to some later day, the strategy bridge has broken down. 3. Ahistorical: America is a future-oriented, still somewhat “new” country , one that has a founding ideology of faith in, and hope for, and commitment to, human betterment. It is only to be expected, therefore, that Americans should be less than highly respectful of what they might [3.81.222.152] Project MUSE (2024-03-28 19:07 GMT) THE AMERICAN WA THE AMERICAN WA THE AMERICAN WA THE AMERICAN WA THE AMERICAN WAY Y Y Y Y: WAR WITHOUT POLITICS : WAR WITHOUT...