Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win

3. The Iraqi Insurgency: Vietnam Perspectives

67 The Iraqi Insurgency The Iraqi Insurgency The Iraqi Insurgency The Iraqi Insurgency The Iraqi Insurgency: : : : : V V V V Vietnam Perspectives ietnam Perspectives ietnam Perspectives ietnam Perspectives ietnam Perspectives 3 3 3 3 3 John Mueller, an expert on war and American public opinion, observed in late 2005 that In Iraq, as they did in Vietnam, U.S. troops face an armed opposition that is dedicated, resourceful, capable of replenishing its ranks, and seemingly determined to fight as long as necessary. In Vietnam, the hope was that after suffering enough punishment, the enemy would reach its “breaking point” and then fade away or seek accommodation. Great punishment was inflicted, but the enemy never broke; instead, it was the United States that faded away after signing a face-saving agreement. Whether the insurgents in Iraq have the same determination and fortitude remains to be seen. The signs thus far, however, are not encouraging: the insurgency does not appear to be weakening.1 An examination of past insurgencies reveals that the combination of a stronger political will, a superior strategy, and external assistance can be a potent formula for insurgent success. Conversely, for the counterinsurgent side, the combination of a weaker political will and an inferior strategy can be a recipe for defeat. What of the present insurgency in Iraq? Does it possess a superior political will and strategy? Is it receiving foreign assistance, and if so, what kind and will that assistance make the difference between victory and defeat? And what BEA BEA BEA BEA BEATING GOLIA TING GOLIA TING GOLIA TING GOLIA TING GOLIATH TH TH TH TH 68 can be said of U.S. political will and strategy in Iraq? Can it stay the domestic political course, or will it end up as it did in Vietnam, being militarily frustrated into a political defeat? Indeed, are there meaningful military and political comparisons between the Vietnam War and Iraq War, and if so, what do they tell about U.S. prospects in Iraq? It is of course profoundly premature to draw anything other than the most tentative conclusions about an insurgency whose outcome cannot be known, although as we shall see, comparisons with Vietnam, which do not and are not intended to suggest the inevitability of defeat in Iraq, provide useful perspectives on the Iraq War. Many facts about the situation in Iraq are already known, and these can be analyzed using conclusions from the previous discussion of why the strong lose and more specifically why great powers lose to overseas insurgencies. Characteristics of the Iraqi Insurgency First, the United States is clearly the stronger side in the Iraq War. It is not only the most powerful state in the world; it also enjoys conventional military supremacy in Iraq as well as a large numerical troop advantage over the insurgents. Second, the Iraqi insurgency differs from the familiar Maoist model in several key respects: it is predominately communally based, urban-centered, decentralized , and heavily invested in terrorism.2 The Chinese and Vietnamese insurgencies were class-based, rural-centered, highly centralized, and comparatively selective in the employment of terror. They also had explicit, comprehensive, and revolutionary objectives: to liberate their countries from foreign power and influence and to establish a new political and social order. The Iraqi insurgency has no explicit political program and no evident social program other than—and here one must rely on inference based on the targets of insurgent violence—effecting the departure of U.S. forces and preventing the emergence of a new, U.S.-backed ethnically proportional Iraqi political order in which the SunniArab minority would be deprived of its traditional political dominance of Iraqi politics.3 Areliable determination of the insurgency’s objectives beyond these apparent general negative aims seems impossible because of the insurgency’s structure and composition. It is a loose confederation of groups, organizations, and individuals with competing agendas in Iraq: a Baathist underground seeking to restore Baathist, or at least Sunni Arab, rule; Baathist mercenaries recruited from freed criminal populations and unemployed army veterans; traditional Iraqi THE IRA THE IRA THE IRA THE IRA THE IRAQI INSURGENCY QI INSURGENCY QI INSURGENCY QI INSURGENCY QI INSURGENCY 69 nationalists aroused by the humiliation of foreign occupation and the cultural offensiveness of initial U.S. counterinsurgency tactics; al Qaeda and other jihadist elements seeking to use the war in Iraq as an opportunity to humiliate the United States and further...