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C H A P T E R F I V E Conclusion: Was the Western-European City-State in the Middle Ages a European Miracle? S O, WAS THE Western-European city-state in the Middle Ages a European Miracle? Some have said that Europe embarked upon a unique historical trajectory because of its investment in a “dynamic technological strategy” (Snooks 1996) or because its people were “inspired by a lively curiosity, insatiable greed, and a reckless spirit of adventure that contrasted sharply with the smug conservatism of Chinese, Moslem, and Hindu cultural leaders” (McNeill 1963:578). Some assert that in Western Europe “rationality was more valued” (Chirot 1994:68). Others have claimed that by the 15th century, “and perhaps long before then, the West had a greater proportion of individuals who understood wheels, levers, and gears than any other region on earth,” thus enabling them to shift from a “rational perception to a quantificational perception” (Crosby 1997:49, 53). This in turn may have given the West technological superiority over the rest of the world (e.g., Cardwell 1994). But all of these presumptions are far from satisfactory. Another position is that postulated by Holton: “Capitalism of a modern kind developedratherintherelativelydecentralizedWest,wherepoliticalstructures were far from monolithic, allowing internal differentiation” (1986:134). But such a monocausal explanation of competition and dynamism is not warranted either. This oft-repeated claim makes the non-West appear unable or unwilling to foster or experience change or interstate competition (see Hymes 1997:347). It is equally Eurocentric to claim, as is done in Marxist theories (e.g., Brenner 1985; Wood 1999), that class struggle in Western Europe (Britain in particular) prepared the way for the “modern” (i.e., capitalist) world, as if “non-Europe had no important role in social evolution at any historical period” (Blaut 1993: CONCLUSION 155 127–128, 149). It is important to avoid Eurocentric assumptions about Western “superiority” in the Middle Ages. This is especially true at a time when the European Union seeks to legitimate its political and socioeconomic integration by subsidizing research that emphasizes the long-term historical unity of Europe, as though the region had been an entity “an sich” and “für sich” for almost ten centuries (e.g. Blockmans 1997). The truth is that the spirit to accumulate capital (e.g., Weber 1930) existed in other civilizations just as much as it did in Europe. As scholars like Joseph Needham have so aptly demonstrated, throughout the Middle Ages non-Europe actually had greater riches and military capacities than did Europe. When it came to technological, military, and socioeconomic matters, 13th- and 14th-century Europe clearly lagged behind the great Asian civilizations . Nevertheless, every scholar who studies the impact of long-term socioeconomic change is eventually confronted with the question of whether, in the period a.d. 1200 to 1500, a single important difference existed between Europe and the rest of the world, a difference that may have had long-term implications resulting in the subsequent “Rise of the West.” Without resorting to “unique exceptionalism” with a teleological streak, one might ask whether there was a significant “turning point” (Hourani 1980:145) in the European political realm. According to Udovitch, “merchants in the Mediterranean Islamic world did not achieve an articulated political identity or acquire political power in a manner comparable to their counterparts in Catholic Europe” (1993:792). Just as I have attempted to describe in the preceding chapters, this statement implies that European political structures were different from non-European ones. In the former, merchant communities and guilds struggled for power in their politically independent city-states (something of a precursor to the interstate system of the 16th century) (Arrighi 1994). Gaining this power was crucial to their success as the merchant elites were then able to use the state infrastructure to their advantage (Kedar 1976:58–80). After all, the key to successful capital accumulation in the long run is not only learning how to keep taxes down, but how to minimize transaction, transportation and security costs by using state resources, preferably taxes derived from the poor, to facilitate capital maximization. To a certain extent, this accumulation and implementation of power should downplay many of the ongoing debates about how “advanced” preindustrial Europe was when compared with the non-European world (e.g., Alam 2000). Another exceptional variable that should be singled out in the context of the emergence of a merchant capitalist system in Western Europe in the Late Middle Ages is...

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