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C H A P T E R 2 AFTER PROLIFERATION Deterrence Theory and Emerging Nuclear Powers Joshua Rovner DETERRENCE THEORY EVOLVED along with the Cold War. For some early American strategists, the relationship between nuclear proliferation and deterrence was selfevident . ‘‘Everything about the atomic bomb is overshadowed by the twin facts that it exists and that its destructive power is fantastically great,’’ wrote Bernard Brodie in 1946. ‘‘Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on it must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.’’1 Brodie’s famous declaration put deterrence in the forefront of the American strategic debate, and the rise of a bipolar international system provided the backdrop for his revolutionary ideas. Intense political competition between the United States and the Soviet Union took on ominous overtones in the shadow of growing nuclear arsenals. How could the superpowers compete with one another without risking annihilation? What did the superpowers need to do in order to reinforce deterrence and preserve the peace? Alternately, was deterrence a foregone conclusion among states with the power to destroy one another? If so, was it possible that stable deterrence would actually encourage conventional aggression among states that were sure that escalation to the nuclear level was impossible? And how could the superpowers deter conventional attacks on their allies? These questions generated whole fields of inquiry: Economists and political scientists developed analytically sophisticated models to describe the interaction between nation-states with the means to deliver unprecedented levels of destruction. Skeptics, including historians and political psychologists, criticized these abstract models for assuming that decision makers would be able to act sensibly under conditions of high stress and for assuming that all states operated according to the same rational principles. They noted that state leaders very often appear ‘‘irrational,’’ that is, unable to rank-order their interests and calculate the consequences of action. This is especially the case during crises, when the combination of stress and time constraints causes leaders to fall back on preconceptions and cognitive biases.2 Critics also argued that states’ interests and preferences can change in the midst of confrontations with other powers, which complicates the task of manipulating – 17 – 18 JOSHUA ROVNER their behavior through carefully calibrated deterrent signals.3 Domestic politics and bureaucratic incentives may skew decisions over the use of force in ways that fall well outside the boundaries of rational deterrence theory. Finally, critics argued that different states might conceive of rationality in very different ways. What looks irrational to outsiders might make perfect sense given a state’s unique history, values, and strategic culture.4 The debates over the requirements for stable deterrence in a bipolar system divided scholars, analysts, and policymakers for decades. They were never resolved. After the Cold War, deterrence theorists turned their attention to regional powers like North Korea, Iran, India, and Pakistan, all of which have pursued nuclear capabilities in the face of substantial international nonproliferation efforts. The rise of nascent nuclear states created a new set of policy dilemmas. Analysts were concerned about relations with emerging nuclear powers that were inexperienced in nuclear diplomacy and unable to offer credible reassurances that they would be reliable custodians of their newly won arsenals.5 Lacking technical experience , these states could not guarantee the quality of safeguards against accidental use or the security of sensitive technologies and fissile material.6 Concerned about vulnerability to a preventive strike, emerging nuclear powers couched their efforts in suggestive but opaque rhetoric, which was sufficiently ambiguous to cause dangerous misperceptions.7 Flush with nationalism and intrigued by the possibilities of nuclear coercion, they were likely to underestimate the danger of nuclear saber rattling .8 And though they also might have been eager to use their new capabilities to push the limits of their political influence, their close proximity to nuclear rivals would limit available warning times and complicate crisis management. Observers feared that overcoming all these problems would be especially difficult for states with unstable political systems and a history of civil–military turmoil.9 Of particular interest were the so-called rogues: Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Syria. Some analysts feared that the character of these states—authoritarian, radical, and risk-acceptant—made them largely impervious to deterrence. Authoritarian leaders lacked accountability for their actions and were less constrained by domestic concerns. And because these leaders were ideologically and politically radical , they were inherently difficult negotiating partners and more likely to...

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