In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

C H A P T E R 1 3 Toward a Theory of Cyber Power Strategic Purpose in Peace and War John B. Sheldon PREVIOUS CHAPTERS FOCUSED on the technical, tactical, and operational aspects of operating in the cyber domain. These are undoubtedly important topics, but this chapter focuses on the strategic purpose of cyber power for the ends of policy. Understanding the strategic purpose for cyber power is important if we are to make informed judgments about its operational and tactical use. This chapter seeks to address a conceptual gap and advance an argument that cyber power does indeed have strategic purpose relevant to achieving policy objectives. This purpose centers on the ability to manipulate the strategic environment through and from cyberspace in peace and war for the ends of policy while simultaneously disrupting, denying, and otherwise interfering with the ability of an adversary to do the same. Cyberwar—An Unhelpful Term Emphatically, this chapter has no use for the term ‘‘cyberwar’’ as it is commonly described in what passes for popular debate. Recently Adm. Mike McConnell, US Navy (ret.), argued that the United States is in the midst of a cyber ‘‘war’’ because of the thousands of ‘‘attacks’’ that take place daily against US government networks as well as the private networks upon which our economy and society depend. He argues, less controversially, that greater investments are needed in cyber defenses, as well as greater regulation of the open architectures on which we rely.1 Yet, the thousands of daily attacks Admiral McConnell describes are actually composed of many incidents, very few—if any—of which could be described as war. These cyber incidences range from attempts by actors to enter our networks to conduct espionage, 207 208 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Toward a Theory of Cyber Power to criminal elements seeking to extort and steal, through to political activists wishing to protest government policies or corporate activities by vandalizing and disrupting legitimate cyber activity, and hackers looking to make a name for themselves among their peers.2 All of these cyber activities are major problems for cybersecurity. They are even a serious threat to overall economic well-being and the security of information and networks. Yet as Clausewitz reminds us, ‘‘War is a clash between major interests, which is resolved by bloodshed,’’ and ‘‘War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. Countless duels go to make up war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by imagining a pair of wrestlers. Each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his will; his immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order to make him incapable of further resistance. War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.’’3 According to Clausewitz’s description of war, cybercrime, espionage, and other such nefarious activities do not constitute war. Lawlessness certainly, violence perhaps—but war? Most certainly not. As Derek Reveron argues earlier in this volume, cyber attacks are disruptive and not yet destructive. Thousands of cyber incidences every day in peacetime do not make a war, but we can think about the use of cyber power in war. The issue, therefore, is not cyberwar, but cyber in war. An understanding of the strategic meaning of cyber power within this context may be of immense value. Another context—the hostile use of cyber power for the ends of policy in what is otherwise peacetime—requires a more precise definition. In terms of cyber power, many of the same activities are being performed but are not necessarily being accompanied by the use of force in the other domains (with the possible exception of covert action by special operations forces or intelligence agencies). In such context, an incident is most definitely occurring, but it is not war. Such activities can be more accurately defined as covert cyber operations, although this term could withstand further refinement. Either way, the strategic purpose of cyber power still applies. Strategy and Cyber Power This chapter asserts that the strategic purpose of cyber power is the ability in peace and war to manipulate the strategic environment to one’s advantage while simultaneously degrading the ability of the enemy to comprehend that same environment. With this assertion in mind, the question must then be asked: what is the relationship between cyber power and strategy? It is proper to attend to the technological, tactical, and operational implications, challenges, and opportunities of cyberspace.4 However...

Share