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CHAPTER 1 Understanding the Afghan Challenge Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla More than a decade into the American intervention in Afghanistan, the status quo there is untenable. The overthrow of the Taliban in 2001–2 had near universal support and was briefly the top foreign policy priority of the United States. But Afghanistan’s importance was downgraded during the Bush administration’s first term because of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. It became the “other war” within policymaking circles and our commitment to this campaign became unclear. Interest in Afghanistan was revived later in the decade when it became a matter of central emphasis for President Obama, its salience underscored by the near doubling of US troops in-country to one hundred thousand since he first took office. Even now, however, one could argue that the level of commitment to the war has been a winding road and remains so. All recognize that Afghanistan is the place from where the 9/11 attacks on America were plotted. If the country reverts to Taliban control it may once again become a major node in the al-Qaeda network. This outcome, which would mean that US and allied efforts in Afghanistan have been in vain, would be seen as unacceptable by the American public and leaders across the political spectrum.1 Thus the stakes are high in Afghanistan, but it is no simple matter to identify effective and realistic endgame strategies, in large part because of the problematic results of the Afghan campaign over the past decade. The striking initial American victory in the fall of 2001, which drove the Taliban and al-Qaeda from power with less than two hundred Special Forces soldiers working with a few thousand friendly tribesmen, was followed by almost nine years of policies and actions on the ground that resulted in deteriorating security conditions. Each new approach taken by the United States and its International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) allies did little to thwart al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In the early years of the war, the various initiatives pursued seemed to rely primarily on wishful thinking, assessing good prospects for success just because 3 4 Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla we so desperately desired to see a secure, democratic state emerge in Afghanistan. Whereas most would now say that this maximalist political goal is beyond reach, the deteriorating security situation began to change for the better in the summer of 2010. By December the momentum, in some key areas, shifted from the Taliban to coalition forces for the first time since early 2002. The consolidation of these gains remains a significant challenge since the Taliban continues to demonstrate resilience and adaptability.2 In unveiling his strategy in a December 2009 speech at West Point, President Obama said: “I have determined that it is in our vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 US troops to Afghanistan. After 18 months our troops will begin to come home.” In one arduously prepared, highly anticipated speech that was supposed to outline a new strategic approach in Afghanistan, the president simultaneously proffered two contradictory policies: escalation and withdrawal. Even a cursory examination of the projected withdrawal timeline revealed troubling inconsistencies. The drawdown of troops from the 2009–10 surge began in July 2011 as President Obama promised, but is following a slow path to returning simply to presurge levels. Significant numbers will remain until 2014—and some presence will likely continue indefinitely. In announcing the specifics of the troop drawdown, Obama added that the US mission in Afghanistan would “change from combat to support” by 2014. “We won’t try to make Afghanistan a perfect place. We will not police its streets or patrol its mountains indefinitely.”3 Presumably, the residual forces that remain for years to come will focus on hunting terrorists. Republican reaction to the current drawdown and the longer-range plan has ranged from tepid and qualified support to opposition, setting the stage for Afghanistan strategy to be a major issue in the 2012 presidential election cycle.4 Coinciding with the drawdown of US troops, Obama announced that the United States supports political reconciliation and incorporation of Taliban groups into the Afghan government if they are willing to break with al-Qaeda.5 However, the phased withdrawal of US and ISAF combat troops has sown seeds of distrust with our Afghan allies, and it has likely emboldened the Taliban and al-Qaeda, despite the military pressure that they are under. Thus it is...

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