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PAST EXPERIENCE INDICATES THAT the enterprise of consolidating peace fails in a high percentage of cases, often within the first few years of a cease-fire. Transforming states and their relationships with societies is even more challenging , and the role of external actors is complex and fraught with risks. The previous chapter explains how postwar inclusion of elites is tied to theoretical notions of state legitimacy, and advocates a “legitimacy-focused peacebuilding” that contains elements of, but differs from, liberal, democratizing, republican, state-capacity-focused, and critical approaches to peacebuilding. Given how difficult it seems for outside actors to foster inclusionary behavior and the state legitimacy that seems so central to making peace stick, is there a role for external legitimacy building? What role, if any, can outsiders play in fostering inclusion and legitimacy? The behavior of elites toward different ethnic or religious groups is shaped by numerous factors that are historically rooted, economically driven, and resistant to outside pressures. National elites and their own leadership (Machiavelli’s virtu)havehistoricallyprovendecisiveintheprocessof layingthefoundationfor a legitimate state in a war-torn society, one in which divided groups eventually consent to conform to the political order and acknowledge, albeit begrudgingly, the authority of political structures, rules, norms, and governments. Exclusionary behavior occurs foremost through the agency of national elites, especially office holders. The ability of international actors to influence such behavior is not straightforward. A less politically engaged role for donors and the UN system— focusing on state capacity, basic needs like health and education, social dialogue, or verifying peace agreements—might seem to make more sense than trying to engage the complex and perilous process of enhancing horizontal legitimacy in war-torn societies. This final chapter argues the contrary. I contend that there is a positive role for external actors in enhancing inclusionary behavior and legitimacy-focused peacebuilding, despite the limits and perils of their influence. Those perils are Can External Actors Build Legitimacy afterWar? 9 Conclusions for Policy and Practice Conclusions for Policy and Practice 237 extraordinary. External actors face systematic and, in most ways, growing constraints in their ability to shape the legitimacy of postwar states through deliberate efforts. The chapter begins with the formidable obstacles facing external actors to engage in the tasks of enhancing inclusionary governance and building legitimate authority. It then returns to the earlier point that no single formula or model of inclusionary governance will guarantee legitimacy. However, I do find a set of persistent challenges, trade-offs, or decision points common to most postwar societies. The chapter then breaks down the process of transition from warfare into four“moments,”ortemporaljunctures,whosedynamicsdifferfromoneanother, butthatholdsomecommonchallengesacrossmostpostconflictsocieties.These four moments are (1) the decision on what structures and which individuals will rule for an interim period, (2) the long-term “design” of the state, (3) elections and the end of an interim administration, and (4) the postelectoral period. Although the first three phases are important, it is the “postelection moment” where exclusionary behavior has led to recurrence in the case studies examined here, and the phase that has been neglected in research. The chapter outlines the particular challenges and possible steps to overcome them for each of these phases in a postconflict environment. In doing so, it advances several principles for peacebuilders that maximize the chances to overcome the obstacles to inclusion and state legitimacy described in the previous chapter. Why Legitimacy Building Is Exceptionally Difficult Given the centrality of political legitimacy for peace consolidation, external actors must recognize up front the severe constraints on their ability to foster this legitimacy. It is difficult for multilateral or bilateral actors to deliberately enhance the legitimacy of a specific regime, and nigh impossible to do so consistently across the gamut of postconflict or fragile states. Why is that the case? The Inherent Conundrum of Enhancing Legitimacy from Without External efforts to enhance legitimacy represent an inherent conundrum or contradiction . To the extent that outside actors use either resources or leverage to influence the state or its relations with society, they substitute for or interfere with the relationship between state and society. The extensive literature on the informal state, the “shadow” state, and the “quasi-state” in Africa shows that the very effort to legitimize a state can and often does readily undermine that state’s legitimacy in important ways (Herbst 2000; Reno 1999; Jackson 1990). It creates or strengthens a constituency (viz., the outside actor) other than its core constituency (its own people). Even a “sincerely autonomous” request by [3.15.143.181...

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