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CONCLUSION MODERN CATHOLIC THINKING on war, with its emphasis on war’s morality, has ignored many of the insights of the long tradition of Christian reflection on the origins of war. Beginning with the Bible and the church fathers and continuing into the Counter-Reformation, Christian thinking about war has coupled the more well-known reflection on the morality of war with a description of the origins of war, in which war is described as being rooted in particular cultural and religious practices that shape the behavior of those responsible for making decisions about war. As modern political thought rejected the basic presuppositions of the traditional Christian view of politics, this perspective on war’s origins was lost; modern political thinkers developed ways of understanding the origins of war based on very different presuppositions. Catholics in the modern period challenged some of the basic principles of modern political thought that conflicted with more traditional Christian principles, but at the same time adopted ways of understanding war’s origins that are derived from those same modern principles. This appropriation has affected both official Catholic teaching on war and the writings of Catholic theologians. Taken together, the emergence of constructivism in the field of international relations theory and shifts in twentieth-century Catholic theology provide an opportunity for developing a more adequate Catholic perspective on the origins of war. I hope this book has provided the beginnings of just such a perspective. I began this book by showing how the Iraq War brought to the fore the frustrating diversity of views within the Catholic Church on the ethics of war, and then I undertook to prove that behind that diversity was an unwitting unity: Most Catholics writing or speaking on war have a perspective on the origins of war that is shaped by theories based on certain presuppositions about the political sphere and its relation to the transcendent, presuppositions that those very Catholics would not accept. To conclude the book, it will be useful to look at how major Catholic voices responded to the Iraq War and how their responses reflect the themes laid out in earlier chapters. I will use these observations to point out areas in which Catholic thinking on war and peace needs to continue to develop. I do not claim that the insights of this book will somehow bring Catholics together, and I may end up being just one more voice amidst 201 202 Conclusion the diversity. I do believe, however, that these ideas can move the conversation forward. Pope John Paul II vocally opposed the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 because the war did not meet the just war criterion of last resort and because it did not have the authorization of the United Nations Security Council. As he stated in his 2003 Address to the Vatican Diplomatic Corps, “As the Charter of the United Nations Organization and international law itself remind us, war cannot be decided upon, even when it is a matter of ensuring the common good, except as the very last option and in accordance with very strict conditions, without ignoring the consequences for the civilian population both during and after the military operations.”1 In John Paul’s view, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was clearly in violation of its obligations toward the United Nations in regards to dismantling its programs for weapons of mass destruction and allowing international inspectors to verify that dismantling, but the international community should have been given more time to force Hussein to comply with those requirements before the United States resorted to violence. The statements of other Vatican officials, such as Jean-Louis Tauran, the Vatican foreign minister, and Pio Laghi, the former Nuncio to the United States, showed that the Vatican was also concerned that military action not take place without the approval of the United Nations.2 Although John Paul’s point—that the threat from Iraq was not so pressing as to prevent further efforts, short of war, to force compliance with UN mandates—has some merit, he does not consider all of the relevant historical background. The sanctions against Iraq were imposed in 1991, following Iraq’s defeat in the Persian Gulf War. By 1995, France and Russia, who had had extensive commercial relationships with Iraq prior to the Persian Gulf War, began advocating for the end of sanctions, despite the ongoing revelations of weapons inspections. Also in 1995, in response to criticisms (including those of John Paul) that the sanctions...

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