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4 The Ming Great Wall of China A Dynasty’s Unending Pursuit of Security Introduction Whereas Athens’ Long Walls and Hadrian’s Wall involved strategic defenses coveringlimiteddistances ,theMingGreatWallofChinaextendedacrossthedynasty ’s massive northern frontier. Although vastly larger and richer than its Mongol adversaries, the Ming Dynasty possessed an insular, status quo perspective that the wall was intended to support. How did the Mongols, whose well-being depended on some level of interaction with China, react to the emergence of this impediment between the steppe and Ming territory? A central consideration both for influencing the adversary and the wall’s impact on the military balance was its gradual expansion over a century. This evolutionary growth facilitates examination of the strategic dynamics involved in cases of partial frontier coverage . Are such efforts doomed to failure or can they be productive given the right context? The enormous scale of the Ming barrier presented immense manning and maintenance challenges, which will be discussed in the last chapter. Given this environment, how does the suboptimal operation of a barrier affect military balance? The Great Wall case presents a good opportunity to observe the effects of the barrier on internal policy debate. Does its allure as a way to “buy time” prompt more fundamental efforts at resolving the acrimonious relationship or does it simply encourage “muddling through”? This chapter focuses on Emperor Chenghua’s decision in the early 1470s to construct the Yansui border wall protecting the Shaanxi Province. The study concentrates on this choice because it led to the construction of the first major section of what would become the Ming Great Wall of China, and because the existing environment allowed a range of possible policy directions. By contrast , during the so-called Second Ordos Debate in the mid-sixteenth century, declining Ming military capabilities made taking the offensive little more than wishful thinking by glory-seeking officials while domestic politics forbade a political accommodation. After examining the Yansui strategic defense system, The Ming GreatWall of China 107 the discussion considers the expansion of the barrier in fits and starts over the next century. The Ming’s long history allows ample opportunity to consider the effectiveness of this obstacle against the Mongols and later the Manchus, as well as its internal effects on policy debate. The Ming, as opposed to earlier Chinese wall-building dynasties, have been selected for examination for both practical and heuristic reasons. As historian Arthur Waldron relates at the beginning of his investigation of the Ming Great Wall, the amount of information available for this era is vastly superior to that for earlier periods.1 Among the existing records is a call in 1470 by an alarmed minister of war, Bai Gui, for ideas on how to stop the increasing Mongol incursions from the bordering Ordos region.2 The Ordos—“territory of the great bend of the Yellow river in the northwest”—functioned as the strategic focus of the Chinese– Mongol struggle during the Ming dynasty.3 Although mountains or rivers partially protected most of the frontier, no major terrain feature separated this New England–sized area from North China. Throughout history, it has been one of the major invasion routes into China and offered an effective base of operations when nomad-controlled, as was then the case. The Ming government, regarding the desert-dominated area as having no economic appeal, had withdrawn army outposts early in the fifteenth century. Yet the region’s modest farming potential from the Mongol perspective exceeded prospects on the even bleaker steppe to the north and had drawn settlements beginning in the late 1450s, to the surprise of the Chinese. Most disturbingly, after a decade the Mongols appeared to be taking up permanent residence in the area.4 Faced with increased raiding from these Ordos-based Mongols by the beginning of the 1470s, Emperor Chenghua, Bai Gui, and other senior officials struggled to address the challenge as “an air of crisis pervaded the court.”5 In March 1471 Zhu Yong, a frustrated Ming commander on the frontier, urged the imperial court in Beijing to adopt a clear policy.6 Rather than responding to Zhu’s plea with action, the government avoided choice by dispatching a series of inspection teams to the frontier. In each case, the lead official—Ye Sheng (right vice minister of rites), Yu Zijun (newly reappointed magistrate of Xian in the Shaanxi Province), and Wang Yue (a civilian general)—recommended constructing frontier walls and other defenses, although Wang Yue also supported an offensive.7...

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