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176 Chapter 5 The Mainland Peninsula The five states of mainland Southeast Asia—Burma,Vietnam,Laos,Cambodia, and Thailand—present a somewhat stiffer test for the hypotheses advanced in this book. It is more difficult to summarize their alignment strategies than the policies of their maritime ASEAN neighbors.All the mainland states save Burma were deeply embroiled in the Third Indochina War.Vietnam and Thailand formed relatively tight alliances for considerable periods during the peak years of the conflict, and each of their mainland neighbors has also entered into tight alliances at various points since 1975. Moreover, unlike the U.S.-led maritime subregion, three great powers have extended their reach into the mainland peninsula—China, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, a shared desire to avoid too much dependence on the great powers and to minimize further conflict has made limited alignments attractive to the mainland states when intense security threats have not required immediate and extensive great-power succor.The result has been a strong collective tendency toward limited alignment and relative neutrality since the end of the Third Indochina War. BURMA/MYANMAR As much as any other Southeast Asian country, Burma has historically prioritized independence and nonalignment in its foreign policy. For most of the Cold War period, despite significant internal security threats, Burma was the most genuinely nonaligned country in the region,tilting only slightly toward Beijing.The upheaval that followed the rise of the SLORC regime in 1988 resulted in a harsh international sanctions program and the threat of Western efforts to destabilize the regime, temporarily driving the new Union of Myanmar into temporarily tight alliance with China. However,Yangon soon reasserted its traditional priority on independence and has pursued a limited pro-PRC alignment for most of the post–Cold War period. Burma was born into a relatively dangerous neighborhood, and its tendency to avoid alignment has not been because of any lack of security threats.Although Burma/Myanmar 177 relations with China and India have been perennial security concerns for Burma, Burma’s leaders have tended to focus even more on internal, centrifugal threats.1 Burma is the second largest country in Southeast Asia, and its diverse population— comprising ten major ethnic groups speaking more than 100 dialects—includes large numbers of ethnic minorities who live in the country’s dense and mountainous northern and eastern jungles. Minority groups have frequently received external support in their struggles against the Burman-dominated central government , and the country’s long, winding borders with China, India, and Thailand are extremely difficult to police effectively.The disproportionate economic power of Burma’s ethnic Indian and Chinese minorities has added to a sense of vulnerability to Chinese or Indian-inspired subversion. Neutrality under Ne Win Throughout the ColdWar era, Burma was a champion of nonalignment, primarily because of the perceived risks of great-power alignment. In 1960 U Nu had articulated the reason why developing countries should moderate their cooperation with great powers in striking terms during the era of the Bandung Conference: “Whatever ideologies they have, whatever policies they outline, whatever resolutions they pose, whatever slogans they shout, in actual practice, whenever there is a conflict with their interests, they are not ashamed to discard their policies, to shelve their resolutions,and to change their slogans as easily and quickly as a woman of no character changing her lovers. Since these great powers are not acting for the interests of anybody else but their own, do not let yourselves be their stooges . . . never trust them completely to the extent of leaving all in their hands.”2 Sovereignty has been a core driver of Burma’s long-standing efforts to preserve relative neutrality. Colonial domination by Great Britain has been a key in shaping the country’s strategic culture and has created a hypersensitivity to perceived threats of foreign interference and neocolonialism.3 Sino-Indian rivalry has also been a perennial concern and Burmese leaders have sought to avoid antagonizing either colossus. During the 1970s geography and Burma’s relative military and economic weakness made it difficult to defeat the BCP and disrupt their supply lines from China. In addition, porous borders and dense jungles enabled some of Burma’s insurgent groups to fund themselves though a massive drug trade.Testy exchanges with India and historically frictional relations with Thailand—where many rebel groups were based—also contributed to security problems for the Burmese government.These threats were by...

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