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Chapter 8 Catholic Moral Theology: Is Pluralism Pathogenic? In previous chapters I have examined the place of respectful disagreement (dissent) in the teaching-learning process of the Church, how it is being threatened by "the chill factor," and how this chill went below the freezing point in the case of Charles E. Curran. The acceptance of a certain amount of disagreement as we struggle to discern the will of the Lord implies the existence ofpluralism in moral theology. In the previous chapter, I attempted to locate the areas of present pluralism. Some take such pluralism in stride as an expected state of affairs in a pilgrim Church that exists in a very baffling and complex world. Not so others. That is why I continue this exploration and raise the question: "Is pluralism pathogenic in Catholic moral theology?" The answer to this question from every segment of the Catholic community would be: "It all depends." For instance, the magisterium itself quietly and peaceably departs from the perspectives of Leo XIII on Church and state. The Catholic Right rejects key aspects of The Challenge of Peace and Economic Justice for All. Many Catholics, along with large numbers of revisionist moral theologians, reject the absolutism ofHumanae Vitae and some conclusions of the instruction on reproductive technology from the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. And most recently, Catholic bishops publicly spar with each other on toleration of instruction in the use of condoms for the prevention of AIDS. That these are examples of pluralism no one would doubt. Are they pathogenic to the believing community,a kind of devastation of itsimmune system against the diseases and ravagesof a hostile viral world? As I said, it 148 / Richard A. McCormick, S.J. all depends. Above all, it depends on one's concept of the Church, what the believing community ought to be as it pilgrimages through history trying to witness to jts Lord. Tell me your notion of church and I believe I can conclude to your attitudes toward moral pluralism. If you think of the Church as an army with a commander-in-chief or as a corporation with a CEO upon whom all responsibility weighs, you are likely to have predictable ideas about pluralism. Important as this point is, it is not the one I want to make in this chapter . Rather I want to address pluralism from the point of view of the contingency of moral knowledge, and specifically from the distinction between a principle and its application. In an interesting lecture ("Science and the Creation of Life") at the University of Chicago, Cardinal Joseph Bernardin noted that Catholic medical ethics leans heavily on the natural law tradition. He then continued: While extolling the strengths and longevity of this tradition, I also must point out its limits. Human experience is a mixed blessing. Contemporary philosophical and sociological developments have made us more aware of the contextual nature of all knowledge. What appears to be a proper understanding or application of an ethical principle in one age may be found wanting or even incorrect in another. It is also possible to confuse the application of a principle for the principle itself. Indeed, medieval scholars sought to distinguish between the unchanging primary principles of the natural law and other, less certain, knowledge.1 This citation makes two extremely interesting points that I want to emphasize and explore. The first is that the very understanding of an ethical principle may change. Bernardin refers to a "proper understanding or application ofan ethical principle," a wording that seems to identify "application " of a principle with the very understanding of the principle itself. This identification is not a slip of the cardinalatial pen. The two notions are so closely related as to be virtually overlapping. When we make certain exceptions to a principle (applications)—or refuse to makethem—we give greater precision to the terms of reference of the principle. We affect its understanding . Similarly, when we modify our understanding of the principle , this immediately entails a shift in the practical instances reached and touched by the principle. We affect its application. Thus we may refer to an "understanding or application of an ethical principle." Let me illustrate this with an example. In several of his speeches Cardinal Bernardin has referred to " the traditional Catholic teaching that there should always be a presumption against taking human life, but in a limited world marked by the effects of sin there are some narrowly defined [3.142.53...

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