The Critical Calling: Reflections on Moral Dilemmas Since Vatican II

7. Pluralism in Moral Theology

Chapter 7 Pluralism in Moral Theology Let me begin with a citation from Civilta cattolica: Catholic principles do not change either because of the passage of time, or because of different geographical contexts, or because of new discoveries , or for reasons of utility. They always remain the same, those that Christ proclaimed, that popes and councils defined, that the saints held and that the doctors defended. One has to take these as they are or leave them. Whoever accepts them in their fullness and strictness is Catholic; whoever wavers, drifts, adapts to the times or compromises can call himself whatever he likes, but before God and the Church he is a rebel and a traitor.1 These words were written in 1899 as an editorial commentary on the condemnation of Americanism. They could well have appeared in last week's Wanderer or National Catholic Register; for they are a symbol of the Catholic integrist mentality. For such a mentality the very title of this chapter does not represent a question; it represents an abominable error and even a heresy. I mention this at the very outset for two reasons. First, it is not the way this discussion ought to be conducted. Second, it is unfortunatelythe way it is frequently conducted. Daniel L. Donavon summarizes many of the discussions during the Modernist controversy as follows: The task of understanding was made more difficult by the use of stereotypes and generalizations. Recourse was constantly being had to "isms" of every kind. Blondel's L'action, for example, was condemned as Kantianism, psychologism and subjectivism.References to life and ex- 132 / Richard A. McCormick, S.J. perience were rejected as fideism, false mysticism and pragmatism. Laberthonniere repudiated scholasticism under whatever form as intellectualism , and Tyrrell called the system that challenged him Vaticanism ', Jesuitism and Medievalism. The atmosphere, in short, was not conducive to either understanding or discussion. The tendency to polarization was an important factor in all that happened.2 With a change of a few scarlet words, that paragraph could be written today about moral theology. The likely candidates for inclusion are: subjectivism , absolutism, situationism, dualism, dissentism, utilitarianism, biologism, consequentialism, deontologism, rationalism, etc. When theological issues get trapped in such language, they are usually suppressed and not faced squarely. When that happens, they return to haunt, harass and hurt us at a later date. If the Modernist crisis teaches us one thing, it is that. If we think we "solve" genuine theological issues with mere formal authority, the problem remains unsolved. For this reason, M. Petre has noted that "had it been feasible for the different sections of modernism to unite in the insistence on one point, which should be vital to all, that point would have been the character and limits of ecclesiastical authority."3 I want, therefore, to discuss pluralism in moral theology without surrounding the idea unduly with other "isms." I will proceed through five points: (1) areas where there is no disagreement; (2) areas of dispute; (3) how the issues get confused; (4) areas of pluralism in medical ethics; (5) some personal procedural suggestions on pluralism. Throughout I will use medical-moral problems as examples. 1. Areas where there is no disagreement. There are two areas here. First, all Catholic theologians would agree that there can be no pluralism at the level of universal principles and formal moral norms. By "universal principles" I mean generally stated moral norms that impose achievement of a value or proscribe a disvalue. An example would be: there is always a presumption against taking human life. Under the term "formal moral norms," we may include two types ofstatements. First, there are normative statements such as "our conduct must alwaysbe just." Second, there are normative statements that build around words that include their own value judgments. For example, "we must never commit murder" (murder=unjustified killing). Equivalent to this type of statement is one that exhaustively states the circumstances (e.g., it is morally wrong to kill a human being merely to give pleasure to a third party). People who advocate pluralism in these types of statements either do not understand them or have placed themselves beyond civil moral discourse. The second area where there is agreement would be the area ofacceptable pluralism. All Catholic theologians would accept pluralism in the following matters. Pluralism in Moral Theology / 133 a. The application of universal principles to contingent facts. The American bishops in their...