Stellwagen: The Making and Unmaking of a National Marine Sanctuary

3: Designation

Chapter 3 Designation By 1988, proponents of marine sanctuary status for Stellwagen Bank were growing impatient with the politics and process of designation. But they were not alone. Since the passage of the National Marine Sanctuaries Act (NMSA) in 1972, only five sanctuaries had been established.1 Early proponents of marine sanctuaries in Washington, D.C., such as the Center for Marine Conservation and Coastal States Organization, struggled just to keep the program alive. The Reagan administration’s crusade against environmental regulation, science, and planning made infant programs like marine sanctuaries, coastal zone management, and Sea Grant easy targets for budget cuts and bureaucratic subterfuge. The word soon got around that anyone trying to advance his or her career in government in these areas should seek other employment. As draconian as the Reagan administration’s environmental policies were, the statutes survived and representatives from coastal states managed to eke out basic levels of funding to keep the programs afloat. Along with many nominations, Stellwagen Bank had languished on NOAA’s Site Evaluation List (SEL) since 1983. There is little doubt that the Reagan administration’s attempts to scuttle the sanctuaries program through the budget and appointments processes had a lot to do with this. But the national marine sanctuaries program, now thirty-five years old, also has suffered greatly by never having a well-defined mission or constituency. As a consequence, political support has been inconsistent. Further complicating matters has been the low priority it has received by its parent agency, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the presumed “oceans agency,” which arguably is inappropriately administered by the Department of Commerce. The principal difficulty facing Stellwagen Bank and other candidate sites Designation 19 was the statutory provision that placed the designation process in the hands of the secretary of commerce (meaning NOAA), with somewhat vague selection criteria and no performance deadlines. This process stood in stark contrast with the more customary practice of congressional designation of national parks, wildlife refuges, seashores, and wilderness areas. As long as authority to designate national marine sanctuaries remained a discretionary administrative process, administrative infighting and White House interference would continue. The Amendments of 1988 Congress partially cleared the logjam in 1988 when it amended the NMSA in a number of significant ways. First, it required the secretary of commerce to designate four sites: Cordell Bank off the coast of central California, Flower Garden Banks in the Gulf of Mexico, Monterey Bay (California), and the Washington Outer Banks. Second, the secretary was required to issue prospectuses and feasibility studies for a number of areas that had been languishing for years. Among these was Stellwagen Bank. The 1988 amendments further required that the prospectus for Stellwagen Bank be submitted to Congress no later than September 30, 1990. The deadline forced NOAA to move Stellwagen from its evaluation list to its active candidate list and to conduct a series of public scoping meetings in 1989. Following the scoping meetings, NOAA prepared a draft environmental impact statement and management plan (DEIS/MP), issued for further public comment on February 8, 1991. To describe congressional proponents of ocean protection as being anything less than ripping mad in 1990 would be an understatement. Not only hadNOAAcontinuedtoplodalong,butitinventedpoliciesitusedforopposing or further delaying designation of new sanctuaries. In Massachusetts Bay, NOAA claimed it was not federal policy to include a federal dredge dump site within the boundaries of a marine sanctuary, as the Commonwealth of Massachusetts , fishermen, and environmentalists had advocated.2 In California, it came up with a new reason for not designating Monterey Bay, claiming the designation of the Channel Islands in 1980 during the Carter administration had fulfilled the region’s quota. This idea of establishing regional balance or representation within the system had never been part of the NMSA, but is an issue that continues to burden the program. 20 D I S C O v E r y Among congressional proponents of marine protection and the general public, there has never been much doubt that priority should be given to those areas where there are clear threats to the marine environment. Representative Leon Panetta, the leading congressional proponent for Monterey Bay, was outraged. Panetta, who would go on to become Bill Clinton’s chief of staff and chairman of the Pew Oceans Commission, would join Gerry Studds, whose Stellwagen proposal also seemed dead in the water, in pressing for immediate congressional designation. For Senator John...