The Harmony of Goodness: Mutuality and Moral Living According to John Duns Scotus

Chapter Four: Virtue: Integrity of Character

ChaPTer four virTue: inTegriTy of CharaCTer The preceding chapters have focused upon the relational aspect within moral living:persons in communion,freedom for values, goodness as beauty. All three have emphasized freedom as key to the moral discussion. This raises the following questions: what value, if any, do the virtues hold in this approach? If virtue is learned behavior, then is character simply the result of a good moral environment? How does freedom relate to virtue? Is freedom the only moral value, or are there other, habitual elements in moral living which promote beauty and goodness? In other words, how does Scotus affirm both the value of freedom and the importance of virtue in moral living? Alasdaire MacIntyre’s seminal study, After Virtue,1 revitalized moral discussion in the years following its 1981 publication. In this insightful work, MacIntyre explains contemporary moral fragmentation in light of a loss of virtue, that is,a lost understanding of the nature and function of virtue and the virtues for moral living. Not only is there a general failure to understand correctly the notion of virtue for classical writers, but there is as yet no coherent moral model which integrates virtue into contemporary discussion. The task for moral theorists today, he argued, involves the rediscovery of the virtue tradition as a superior moral paradigm. The years since 1981 have seen increased interest and discussion of the nature of virtue, of its role in moral living and of its influence 1 Alasdaire MacIntyre, After Virtue (South Bend, IN: Notre Dame Press, 1981, 1986). THE HARMONY OF GOODNESS 120 on moral character. Multiple studies on virtue ethics have been published. Scotus’s moral discussion affirms both the centrality of freedom and the importance of natural gifts and virtues. He attempts to bridge the metaphysical and moral domains with the affirmation that rational love holds the key to moral excellence. The relationship between freedom and virtue exhibits that mutuality which is within the human heart: we are both naturally and freely drawn to love rightly what we perceivetobegood.Virtuesarethosenaturaldispositionstoward the good; they represent the innate dynamic perfectibility of rational beings. Nonetheless, despite their value, virtues never replace free choice. In fact, they are grounded on freedom and are themselves generated by acts of choice within the will. They perfect the agent through repetition. Traditionally, classical and medieval authors identify two classes of virtue: the theological (faith, hope and charity) and the moral (among which the cardinal virtues, prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance hold pride of place). Prudence, right reasoning, governs the moral virtues within the will, but is itself located in the intellect.Scotus’s teaching on virtue reveals a harmony among several dimensions: the natural (insofar as virtues are dispositions in the will), the moral (insofar as they are the product of choice and governed by prudence), the intellectual (insofar as prudence unifies and directs virtues) and the theological (insofar as some virtues are infused by grace). Virtue underpins the workings of free choice: the virtues enhance the operation of the free and rational will. This enhancement is double: intensively and extensively. Intensively, virtues strengthen the relationship of right reasoning to the good, enabling the will to choose the good with ease. Extensively, the virtues support the establishment of character throughout a lifetime. The relation of virtues to the will resembles the organization of pieces in the wind chime to its center. There can be any number of pieces. They can be large or small. Their material could be metal, wood or ceramic. The presence of the pieces around the disk is required for the VIRTUE: INTEGRITY OF CHARACTER 121 music: their number, size and material determine what sort of sound the chime produces. Larger, stronger pieces are needed for a deep, rich tone. Smaller pieces balance these with lighter, more delicate sound. Not every chime has the same pieces. Likewise, not everyone possesses the same natural virtues, yet everyone has at least a few inclinations toward goodness. Like the pieces, virtues surround the moral centerpiece (the will) and help to constitute the harmony of character. Scotus affirms the natural value of dispositions toward the good. He holds, for example, that despite the will’s innate freedom,itcannotreject(theLatinnolleissometimestranslated as‘to nill’) the good,nor can it choose (velle or‘to will’) evil under the aspect of evil. This affirmation ties him to his theological predecessors, Anselm, Bonaventure and Aquinas. Despite this key area...