The Harmony of Goodness: Mutuality and Moral Living According to John Duns Scotus

2. Rational Freedom and The Will's Moral Affections

oral The key piece in any wind chime is the center disk. This mustbe adequately weighted to hang in a straight manner.Itmust also be light enough to be moved by the wind. The disk anchors the balance of the chime and makes possible the beautiful music. Like the disk, the will is the centerpieceofScotus's moral discussiolL It too is weighted with love for the good. It is balanced within itself by means of two innate moral affections: for goods of intrinsic value and goods of use. Scotus follows Anselm and calls them the affection forjustice (aftectiojustitiae) and the affection for possession(aftectio commod!). These moral affections manifest the complexity of rational desire which exists in a creative tension: when they exhibit internal balance there is self-control This self-control informsallmoral decisions with rationality. There is also a deeper dimension to the will, one by means of which Scotusexplains its capacityfor self-movementThis is the order of freedom . In his discussion offreedom, Scotus relies on Aristotle's metaphysical account of rational causes. Together, the Anselmian discussion of moral affections and the Aristotelian analysis of rational freedom offer an explanation ofmoral action inwhich philosophy and theology cooperate. Anselm's perspective touches upon the reality of human experience. Aristotle provides a more scientific explanation of conditions in reality which make our experience possible. Both view the moral realm asoneofrationalityand freedom for self-control 25 26 In 1951, Dom Odon Lottin published a famous study of the development of moral theology during the Middle Ages.' In this study, he identified two phases in the 13th century discussion of freedom and free will. Prior to 1250, thinkers focused upon the nature of free will (liberum arbitrium) and not upon the nature of freedom which is exercised in choice. Originally, Augustine's discussion in De libero arbitrio referred to free will as the faculty which is indifferent to good and evil, thus making sin theresultofan act of free will. Ansehn (iB 1079)rejected this definition, noting that power to sin is itself an imperfection, and in !tis treatise De tibero arbitrio defined free will as the power to conserve the rectitude of the will in view of that rectitude itself.' Free will is both rational and free to affirm what reason proposes. Right willing realizes the formal concept of liberty.' In other words, according to Anselm, I am mostfree when Iactrightly. The years between 1200 and 1250 produced a refinement of this question, as philosophers and theologians sought a better integration, raising questions about whether or not free will was distinct from reason and will or whether itjOined the two as source or as product. Alexander of Hales (iB 1245) considered it a power between reason and will which chooses but does not necessitate the consent of the will in execution. Odon Rigaud (1245) and Bonaventure (iB 1274)both called it a free faculty: Bonaventure referred to the union of reason and will as coneors' in free will. Aquinas (iB 1274) saw it in light of the act of choice and called ita power identical to the will and impregnatedwithreason.' The entrance of Aristotelian ethics affected the discussion around free will as well. Aristotle's texts were accompanied by Arab commentaries which, ingeneral, painted the universe as operating outof cosmic necessity. Latin Masters in the Faculty of Arts after 1250 defended "astral determinism": the position that the stars affect, perhaps even determine, the decisions we make. Through the remainder of the 13th century, the moral question focused on the nature of freedom, especially after Odon Rigaud raised (and Bonaventure reprised) the question of the relationship of free will to deliberation about contingent I PsychologieetrrwraleauxXIIeetXIlIesiecles, tome1.Gembloux1957,11-389. 2 Dialogusde liberoarbitrio,PL 158,494B. , Dialogw;50l-2. 4 IISent25, q. 5.SeeLottin'sdiscussionofthis on p.179. 5 Lottin,op. cit., 216. RatwnalFreedom and the Will's Moral Affectwns acts. Odon stated, for example, that the blessed in heaven no longer possess free willsince they nolonger deliberate: theyjustlove Godfreely. As early as 1267 the tradition following Bonaventure in the persons of Gauthier ofBrugesand Gerard d'Abbeville (1269) affirmed the essential freedom and autonomyofthe will. The final years of the century witnessed a sustained defense of the will as immediate and autonomous cause ofwilling. The Condemnation of 1277 rejected astral determinism and reaffirmed the freedom of the will not to follow thejudgmentof reason, at least in this life. After 1277, the Franciscanvoluntarist traditionemphasized...