Early Oxford Lecture on Individuation

The Principle Of Individuation / De Principio Individuationis

2 JOHN DUNS SCOTUS DE PRINCIPIO INDIVIDUATIONIS1 [QUAESTIO I UTRUM SUBSTANTIA MATERIALIS EX NATURA SUA SIT HAEC SCILICET SINGULARIS ET INDIVIDUALIS.] 1 Circa distinctionem tertiam, in qua tractatur de personalitate angelorum, quaeritur primo de singularitate in substantiis materialibus, quia secundum quod diversimode dictur de causa individuationis in substantiis materialibus, secundum hoc sentiunt diversimode diversi de personalitate angelorum, de personalitate eorum in una specie vel unitate. Quaeritur ergo primo utrum substantia materialis ex natura sua sit ‘haec,’ scilicet singularis et individualis; et non intelligitur de singularitate secundum quod dicit secundaum intentionem, correspondentem universaliti (extremo suo), sed intelligitur quaestio an substantia materials de se, ex natura sua, sit una numero, indivisibilis in plures. [ARGUMENTA PRO ET CONTRA] 2 Quod sic: videtur per illud Philosophi VII Metaphysicae,2 qui dicit quod universale non est substantia (contra Platonem) sic: “Substantia uniuscuiusque propria est ei cuius est, et non inest alteri”; sed universale inest multis; ergo universale non est substantia. –– Sed si substantia uniuscuiusque propria est ei cuius est et non inest multis, ergo naturaliter. Hoc etiam arguitur per aliam rationem eius ibidem,3 quod “substantia non dicitur de subiecto, universale autem dicitur de subiecto”; ex hoc arguitur quod substantia materialis de se est haec, aliter enim diceretur ex se de subiecto.— 1 The Latin text is taken from Ioannis Duns Scoti Lectura, II d. 3 pars 1, q. 1-6. (ed. Vaticana, Vol. XVIII, 1982, pp. 229-293). 2 Aristoteles, Metaphysicae VII, c. 13, 1038b 10-11. 3 Ibid., 1038b 15-16. INDIVIDUATION 3 THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION [QUESTION ONE IS A MATERIAL SUBSTANCE OF ITS NATURE “THIS,” THAT IS, SINGULAR AND INDIVIDUAL?] 1 Concerning the third distinction (which treats of the personality of the angels) the first question raised is about the singularity in material substances. For it is on the basis of the divergent views about the cause of individuation in material substance that their proponents think differently about the personality of the angels, and about their personality or unity in one species. The first question then is whether a material substance by its very nature is a “this,” that is, singular and individual. And here “singularity” is not understood as a second intention corresponding to “universality” as its opposite, but the question concerns the material substance itself. Is a material substance of its very nature numerically one, incapable of division into several individuals? [INITIAL ARGUMENTS PRO AND CON] 2 [AFFIRMATIVE] It seems that it is according to the Philosopher (VII Metaphysics: ch. 13) who asserts that a universal is not a substance (against Plato). Thus he says: “The substance of each thing is that which is peculiar to it and does not belong to many things”; but a universal does belong to many things; therefore, a universal is not a substance. But if the substance of anything is peculiar or proper to that thing in which it is and is not to be found in many things, then this is something due to its nature, something it has naturally. Another argument he makes in the same place is that “substance is not predicable of a subject, but the universal is always predicable of some subject.” The inference drawn from this is that a material substance is of itself a “this,” for otherwise it would of itself be predicated of a subject. 4 JOHN DUNS SCOTUS 3 Contra: Quod convenit alicui ex se, convenit ei in quocumque est; ergo si naturae lapidis conveniat quod de se sit haec, igitur convenit ei in quocumque est, et per consequens non possunt plures lapides esse. 4 Item, cui convenit ex se unum oppositorum, ei repugnat oppositum; si igitur naturae lapidis conveniat quod de se singularis sit, ergo ei repugnat multitudo in eadem specie. [I. AD QUESTIONEM. [A. OPINIO ALIORUM] 5 [opinionis expositio] Ad hanc quaestionem dicunt quidam quod inter naturam rei et suam singularitatem non est aliqua causa media: non est causa aliqua ulterior quaerenda, medians inter naturam et singularitatem, sed illa quae sunt causa rei inesse in natura sua, sunt etiam causa rei in sua singularitate (quae sunt causae rei concurrentes: agens, materia et forma, et finis). 6 Huius autem rationem assignant, quia res, circumscripto omni alio, habet quod sit singularis, –– sed non habet quod sit universalis nisi per operationem intellectus. Ex hoc arguitur: quando aliqua conveniunt alicui diversimode, unum secundum quid et aliud simpliciter, –– licet illud quod convenit alicui secundum quid, ei conveniat ab alio, tamen quod sequitur rem simpliciter in...