In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

283 CHAPTER THIRTEEN OCKHAM AND THE TEXTBOOKS: ON THE ORIGIN OF POSSIBILITY1 The neophyte in scholastic philosophy can scarcely avoid receiving a distorted view of Ockham’s doctrines if he reads the neo-scholastic textbooks used in most of our seminaries and colleges today. To illustrate this contention, we have selected the question of the origin of possibility. We have examined thirteen typical textbooks whose publication dates roughly cover the period of the past two generations.2 Each of these works has enjoyed a great measure of popularity among seminary and college professors in its day, and practically all have gone through several editions or reprintings. Yet, in none of these works could we find a fair or an accurate presentation of Ockham’s position. Careful examination seemed to reveal that, in general, the older the work, the less erroneous the statements it contained. This progressive misrepresentation of the Venerable Inceptor could be explained plausibly on the ground that the more recent authors simply copied from the earlier works. Most of the authors do not bother to quote any text in Ockham where the opinion they attribute to him is to be found. Five, however, do give us a reference, and in all five cases the text referred to is the same, namely question two of the 43rd distinction of the first book of the Commentary on the Sentences. Because of the difficulty in obtaining this work at the time I wrote this essay, I appended a corrected edition of this question based on the best manuscripts.3 If the readers of this essay will but compare the doctrine Ockham presents in this question with the position that the textbook authors ascribe to him, we feel sure they will come to the same conclusion that we did, namely, that those responsible for our textbooks did not even make an effort to read the text of Ockham to which they referred their students. We shall give first a brief analysis of the contents of this question in Ockham, and then compare the Ockham of the text with the Ockham of the textbooks. I. Analysis of the Question The problem discussed is this: Are things impossible because God cannot make them, or is it rather that God cannot make them because they are impossible ? In this question, the conjunction “because” is intended to express some priority of nature. Whether Henry of Ghent was the first to formulate this particular problem or not, at least his question and the solution he gave to it became the starting point for a similar discussion by at least three of the later scholastics, 284 SCOTUS & OCKHAM Duns Scotus, William Ockham, and Peter Aureoli.4 The last two have developed their doctrines independently of each other, but both Ockham and Aureoli first give Henry’s position and then Scotus’s before presenting their own. 1. Solution of Henry of Ghent Briefly, Henry’s answer to the problem is this. The possibility of creatures has its origin in the omnipotence of God; impossibility on the contrary originates with creatures. Hence, creatures are possible because God can make them, whereas God cannot make what is self-contradictory because it is impossible . In other words, we must attribute omnipotence to God before we can attribute, possibility to a creature. But with impossibility, it is just the other way around. We do not attribute impossibility to a creature. Henry tells us, because we have first attributed some impotency to God, for impotency is not something real or positive in God; it is a negation. The guiding principle for Henry’s solution to this problem is one which Ockham quotes quite literally: “Si vero illud quod attribuitur Deo secundum rationem sui nominis significat aliquid quod non est dignitatis simpliciter, etsi tale Deo attribuitur, hoc non est secundum se et primo, sed quia aliquid attribuitur creaturae et ex respectu eius ad Deum, illud Deo attribuitur.”5 Whatever is not purely and simply a perfection (aliquid dignitatis simpliciter) is not attributed to God primarily or as such. To this category belongs, first of all, every so-called relative perfection, for instance, the notions of creator, or cause, etc. which imply relations to creatures. Secondly, all privations or negations are included, such as God’s impotence with regard to the impossible. But is not omnipotence itself a relative perfection? Does it not imply a relation to creatures? Here Henry introduces a distinction, God’s omnipotence or active possibility, he tells us, can be considered in...

Share