Scotus for Dunces: An Introduction to the Subtle Doctor

Appendix Two

Appendix Two Reading One Ordinatio III, distinction 7, question 3. The Predestination of Christ and His Mother1 I ask: Was Christ predestined to be the Son of God? … I reply: Predestination consists in foreordaining someone first of all to glory and then to other things which are ordered to glory. Now the human nature in Christ was predestined to be glorified, and in order to be glorified, it was predestined to be united to the Word, in as much as such glory as it was granted would never have been conferred on this nature had it not been so united. Now if it would not be fitting to ordain one to such glory if certain merits were absent, whereas it would be fitting if they were present, then such merits are included in the predestination . And so it would seem that this union by way of fitness is ordered to this glory, although it is not exactly as merit that it falls under this predestination. And just as it is foreordained that this nature be united to the Word, so it is predestined that the Word be man and that this man be the Word. But you may object that primarily predestination regards the person and hence one must first find some person to whom God predestined (1) the glory and then (2) this union with reference to the glory. Now you will find no divine Person to whom God predestined this union [as a means of glory]. Obviously he did not do so to the Word in so far as he is the Word. Neither was this union predestined as a means of glory to the Word as subsisting in a human nature, because to the extent that he subsists in this way, the union is already included. 174 SCOTUS FOR DUNCES I reply: we can deny that predestination concerns persons only, for if God can love a good other than himself, not only when it is a person, but also when it is a nature, then for its sake he can also select and ordain in advance some good suitable to it. Consequently , he can choose (1) glory and (2) the union as a means of glory, not only for the person, but also for some nature. It is true, however, that in all cases other than this, predestination does concern the person, for in no other instance has God foreordained a good to a [human] nature without by that very fact foreordaining it also to some person, for the simple reason that no other human nature subsists save in a created person to whom the good can be foreordained. But in our case this is not so. At this point, however, two doubts arise. First, does this predestination depend necessarily upon the fall of human nature ? Many authorities seem to say as much when they declare the Son of God would never have become incarnate had man not fallen. Without passing judgment it can be said that so far as priority of objects intended by God is concerned, the predestination of anyone to glory is prior by nature to the prevision of the sin or damnation of anyone (according to the final opinion given in distinction forty-one of the first book). So much the more then is this true of the predestination of (that soul) which was destined beforehand to possess the very highest glory possible. For it seems to be universally true that one who wills ordinately, and not inordinately, first intends what is nearer the end, and just as he first intends one to have glory before grace, so among those to whom he has foreordained glory,he who wills ordinately,would seem to intend first the glory of the one he wishes to be nearest the end, and therefore he intends glory to this soul [of Christ] before he wills glory to any other soul, and to every other soul he wills glory before taking into account the opposite of these habits [namely, the sin or damnation of anyone]. Authorities to the contrary can all be explained in the sense that Christ would not have come as redeemer, if man had not sinned. Perhaps, too, he would not have been able to suffer, since there would have been no need of a union with a passible body 175 APPENDIX 2 for this soul glorified from its first moment of existence, to...