Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle

Appendix II

APPENDIX II BOOK SIX QUESTION ONE [A Cancelled Text] 1 [20] Further,1 you should keep in mind that when some remote genus is divided by a first division, it is not immediately divided into genera that are proximate to the most special species, as is evident in the case of any category. Therefore, when a science of a very general genus is divided primarily, as is evident generally from what is said, it is not divided into sciences that are said to be one in the first way, [which is the unity characteristic of the most special sciences] nor in that of the second way, which is that of genera proximate to the most special species; for perhaps there are as many sciences that are one in the second way as there are most special species having some proper attributes. For in regard to each [such species] there is some principle, such as predicating its quiddity or essence of that species; and there is some conclusion such as demonstrating that its proper attribute inheres in that species [necessarily]. 2 Therefore, there remains besides the two aforesaid ways of speaking, still the need to look for another by which a science is in some way one, although it is less one than in any of the aforesaid ways, and is distinct from them by a distinction that is greater than that whereby the aforesaid ways are distinguished among themselves. For in ascending [in generalities] one always comes upon something more common in itself that is less one and perhaps more distinct from another. 3 Know, then, that beyond the second degree of unity, it would seem that two additional grades could be assigned. The first when the subject containing the truth of many principles and conclusions is something common to many inferior [genera] of which the primary attributes of such a common [subject] could be shown through the knowledge of that common [subject]. And inasmuch as it is 1 The status of this appendix as a ‘cancelled text’ is attested to by Maurice O’Fihely in his notes on Scotus’s Metaphysics; cf. ed. Vives VII, 323b. 32 THE METAPHYSICS OF JOHN DUNS SCOTUS more common, to that extent is it less one. And then a habit inclining formally to contemplating such a common notion would incline one virtually first to think theoretically about the principles and conclusions of such a common [subject], and also about those principles and conclusions that pertain per se, though not primarily, to inferior [or more specific subjects], so that all the truths, whether they be about that first common [subject] or about what can be predicated of its inferiors, would be said to pertain to one science. Such, indeed, would be one generically in a genus that is more remote than that of the second grade, since there is less agreement of what is known of it per se, though not primarily, because of the lesser unity of the habit that virtually contains those things known, even as the object of that habit itself has a lesser unity. 4 The other degree would seem to be when, in addition to what is said to be known of the inferiors in the preceding grade through the common nature, there is also known what is proper to these inferiors. All this would be said to constitute one science because of the one genus subject, the formal habit of which virtually inclines one [who has the habit] to all the other things that are true of the inferiors on the basis of that [most common] nature. But to those things that are true of the inferiors through their own proper nature, this habit does not incline either per se or primarily, but only in general and potentially. And from such an inclination one could never sufficiently acquire actual knowledge of such, as one could in the preceding grade. [21] In this way, therefore, there would seem to be four grades in the unity of a scientific habit. 5 The first when it is only of one proposition, as “man is risible.” 6 The second, of those habits of properties which belong to the many things included in one most special species, as “man is risible ,” “man is a biped,” amd the other conclusions and principles concerning ‘man’. 7 The third is of those habits and proper principles which pertain to the many things included under one common [subject] and through it of what agrees with the inferiors...